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Abstract 
 The rapid detection and processing of potential threats enables a fast response to 
danger and provides a survival benefit (e.g. LeDoux, 1996; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). 
Theories of threat processing suggest that we have a specialized threat module that 
enables the automatic (i.e. bottom-up driven) detection and evaluation of stimuli with a 
high threat value (Bentz & Schiller, 2015; LeDoux, 1996; 2015; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 
2001). Such theories suggest that threat processing is (largely) unaffected by top-down 
cognitive influences, but it remains debated whether attention to threat is contingent on 
top-down influences.  
 Furthermore, it remains unexplored whether top-down processes can differentially 
affect the pre-attentive orienting of attention to threat and the subsequent disengagement 
of focal attention from such a threat. Strong versions of the threat module would predict 
that both the early (i.e. orienting) and later processing (i.e. disengagement) of threat 
should be unaffected by top-down influences, whereas more moderate versions would 
propose only the early stages of threat processing (i.e. orienting) to be unaffected by top-
down processes. Theories of attention on the other hand do not explicitly model attention 
to be contingent on a stimulus’ threat value. Such theories propose that only a stimulus its 
features (e.g. green) can be processed pre-attentively and thus a stimulus’ identity and its 
associated threat value should not drive orienting (Treisman & Gelade, 1980, Wolfe, Cave, 
& Franzel, 1989; Wolfe, 1994, 2006). Moreover, such theories propose that both orienting 
and disengagement should be subject to top-down modulation, albeit perhaps to different 
degrees (see Carrasco, 2011). 
In this thesis I assessed whether top-down task goals modulate attention to threat. I 
assessed specifically how the relevance of a potential threat to the current task-goal 
affects the orienting and disengagement of attention. To disentangle orienting and 
disengagement, I developed a novel cueing paradigm that controlled the allocation of 
attention before the threat presentation. On disengagement trials, attention would be pre-
cued to the threat location; on orienting trials attention would be pre-cued to one of the 
non-threat locations. The goal-relevance of the threat was manipulated by rendering the 
threat distractor its identity similar or dissimilar to one of the targets. 
In Chapter 2, I assessed the influence of top-down task goals on the 
disengagement of focal attention. Specifically, I investigated whether disengagement from 
a simplistic threat distractor (spider silhouette) is contingent on the threat distractor’s 
relevance to the immediate task-goal. Across two experiments I varied which stimuli were 
the designated targets (coloured green) that required a response. The results show that 
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the threat distractor delayed disengagement when its identity was relevant to the current 
task-goal (i.e. identify whether the target is a spider or cat), but not when it was irrelevant 
to the task-goal (i.e. identify whether the target is a bird or fish). Thus, chapter 2 provides 
initial evidence that disengagement from threat is contingent on the current task-goals. 
In chapter 3, I assessed the influence of top-down task goals on the orienting of 
attention to threat. Specifically, I investigated whether orienting to photorealistic threats 
(spider pictures) is contingent on their relevance to the immediate task-goal. Across two 
experiments I observed that attention was rapidly oriented to the threat distractor when its 
identity was relevant to the current task-goal and much reduced when it was task-
irrelevant. Thus, chapter 3 indicates that, not only the disengagement of focal attention, 
but also the early pre-attentive orienting of attention to threat is contingent on the current 
task-goals. 
In chapter 4, I assessed whether orienting to a task-goal irrelevant threat is 
contingent on stimulus-specific fear and the time-on-task (especially the number of threat 
presentations). Specifically, I investigated whether the orienting of attention to a task-goal 
irrelevant threat (photorealistic spider) is enhanced in individuals who were more fearful of 
the threat and decreases with increased time-on-task. The results showed that orienting to 
a task-goal irrelevant threat was observed only for relatively more fearful individuals and 
that such orienting rapidly decreased with increased time-on-task. Thus chapter 3 
indicates that orienting to a goal-irrelevant threat was contingent on elevated fear and 
limited time-on-task. 
In summary, the current thesis suggests that top-down processes can modulate 
both the pre-attentive orienting to and the disengagement of focal attention from threat. 
Thus, the results of the current thesis are not in line with an encapsulated fear module. 
Instead, the influence of current task goals on the initial orienting of attention to threat 
implies that even the earliest stages of threat processing are contingent on an organism’s 
top-down goals. I would like to speculate that such orienting may be feature-driven as 
specific stimulus features may have become imbued with a threat value and is thus not 
necessarily at odds with existing theories of attention. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction and Overview 
  
  2 
After several years spent studying visual attention, I am no faster to locate my 
wallet when I am about to leave for work in the mornings. What has improved though is my 
understanding of the processes that influence the ease with which I can locate my wallet. 
Many mornings my dining room is cluttered with books, a laptop, pencils and paper, 
Legos, breakfast utensils, school bags, sunhats, and lunchboxes. The basic challenge that 
my visual system is confronted with on such mornings, as well as in many other situations, 
is that there are more stimuli present in the environment than my limited-capacity visual 
system can process (see e.g. Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Egeth & Yantis, 1997).  
Which stimuli are selected for visual processing and which stimuli remain largely 
unprocessed in such a crowded environment is not a random process though. The 
distribution of visual processing resources is critically dependent on attention. Specifically, 
attended stimuli are prioritized for processing, whereas unattended stimuli are inhibited 
(see e.g. Desimone & Duncan, 1995; for a review see Carrasco, 2011). Even the 
processing of salient stimuli has been shown to be contingent on attention. For example in 
a seminal study, Simons and Chabris (1999) demonstrated that when, in a crowded scene, 
attention was directed to the feature ‘white’ (i.e. count the number of passes made by 
players in white shirts), 92% of participants failed to notice a black gorilla. However, when 
in exactly the same scene, attention was directed to the feature ‘black’ (i.e. count the 
number of passes made by players in black shirts), the majority of participants saw the 
black gorilla. The neural mechanisms that underlie such prioritized processing of attended 
stimuli are outside the scope of this thesis, but localized increases in neuronal 
synchronization have been demonstrated to be one way in which the processing of 
attended stimuli is boosted (Fries, Reynolds, Rorie, & Desimone, 2001; Steinmetz, 
Fitzgerald, Hsiao, Johnson, & Niebur, 2000). 
The attentional effect in the study described above by Simons and Chabris (1999) is 
a top-down driven effect, as attention was directed to the white or black features in the 
scene according to the top-down task-goal. The gorilla (which was irrelevant to the task-
goal) was more likely to be processed to full awareness when its color was similar to that 
of the stimuli to which attention was directed in a goal-driven manner. In line with such top-
down driven modulation of attention, my wallet should attract attention more readily if it is 
the object I am currently searching for (i.e. my search target), whereas it should be 
attended less readily if I would be searching for my keys or another object.  
In addition to being contingent on the current goals of an individual, attention is also 
driven by bottom-up processes like salient stimulus features (Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Beck 
& Kastner, 2009; Connor, Egeth, & Yantis, 2004; Reynolds & Desimone, 2003; Treisman & 
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Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, Butcher, Lee, & Hyle, 2003). For example, attention can be allocated 
rapidly to letters that are characterized by a sudden onset (see e.g. Jonides & Yantis, 
1988) or geometrical shapes with a salient color, even if this feature is not relevant to the 
current task-goal (see e.g. Theeuwes, 1992). In line with such bottom-up driven 
modulation of attention, my wallet should attract attention more readily if it would be bright 
green rather than a less salient beige, or if it featured a flashing light.  
Whereas both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms have been demonstrated to 
guide attention, it remains debated how certain classes of stimuli – especially stimuli 
imbued with an emotional value - are prioritized for attention (see e.g. Wolfe & Horriwitz, 
2004; Fedorenko, Duncan, & Kanwisher, 2013; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). For 
example, research has demonstrated that attention is more readily allocated to stimuli 
associated with reward (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011) or threat (for a review see, 
Yiend, 2010). In this thesis, I focus on prioritized attention to potential threats. 
 
Prioritized attention to threat. 
Imagine that you are sitting in the passenger seat of a car. You are seated next to 
your friend who is driving the both of you to a restaurant. Your friend is focussed on the 
task of navigating through the busy peak hour traffic, so you aimlessly look around. All of a 
sudden you notice a black spider on the dashboard. You stare at the spider for a while, 
interrupting your goal-less scanning of the surrounds. After a while, you notice that there is 
a beetle on the dashboard too. Research indicates that it is not an aberration that you first 
attended to the spider and only subsequently to the beetle. Potential threats – including 
spiders – have been repeatedly shown to be prioritized for attention over non-threatening 
stimuli – including beetles (for reviews see Cisler & Koster, 2010; Yiend, 2010). For 
example, in a seminal visual search study Öhman and colleagues demonstrated that 
potentially threatening pictures of spiders and snakes were detected more rapidly than 
pictures of flowers and mushrooms (Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). In similar vein, Lipp 
and Waters (2007) demonstrated that the detection of a neutral target animal was slowed 
more in the presence of a potentially threatening spider or snake distractor than in the 
presence of a non-threatening cockroach or lizard distractor. Prioritized attention is not 
limited to animal threats but has also been shown with angry faces and complex threat 
scenes. For example, angry faces have been reported to be detected more rapidly than 
faces with a non-threatening expression (Fox, Lester, Russo, Bowles, Pichler, & Dutton, 
2000). Threatening scenes (e.g. depicting assault or attacking animals) have been shown 
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to slow responding to a neutral target more than non-threatening scenes (e.g. depicting 
buildings or people; Kappenman, MacNamara, & Proudfit, 2015).  
In addition to evidence provided by studies using the visual search paradigm, 
evidence for prioritized spatial attention to threat is provided by studies using other 
paradigms, particularly the dot-probe paradigm (with a single and double cueing variety; 
(for a review see Yiend, 2010). Other paradigms like rapid serial visual presentation 
(RSVP), emotional Stroop, filtering, and change blindness have also been used to study 
attention to threat. However, these paradigms do not assess spatial attention (e.g. RSVP 
tasks assess attention over time at the same spatial location (unless multiple RSVP 
streams in distinct spatial locations are presented simultaneously). which is the topic of 
focus in the this thesis.  
In addition to the visual search paradigm, the dot-probe (also often referred to as 
cueing) paradigm is probably the most frequently employed paradigm to assess spatial 
attention to threat. Two different versions of the dot-probe paradigm have been employed: 
a so-called single cueing and double cueing variety. In the double cueing dot-probe 
paradigm two pictures, e.g. a threat and a neutral picture, are presented simultaneously on 
either side of fixation for a specified duration (e.g. 500 ms). Subsequently, a neutral target 
(e.g. a dot or arrow) is presented with equal likelihood in one of these two locations. If 
attention is prioritized towards the threat distractor, then RTs should be shorter when the 
target follows in the same spatial location as the threat compared to when it appear in the 
opposite location (see e.g. Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004b; MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986). The single cueing paradigm differs from the double cueing dot-
probe paradigm, in that only a single threat or non-threat distractor precedes the 
presentation of a neutral target. In this paradigm, again the target can be presented in the 
same location as the threat distractor or in the opposite, non-cued, location and prioritized 
attention orienting to threat is deduced if target responding is faster when the target is 
cued by the threat compared to the non-threat stimulus (see e.g. Koster et al., 2006; 
Mathews, Fox, Yiend, & Calder, 2003). Dot-probe, visual search, and studies using other 
paradigms will be discussed more elaborately in the section of this chapter that introduced 
the different processes involved in spatial attention (e.g. p. 11 onwards) as well as in the 
introductory sections of subsequent chapters. 
Prioritized attention to threat over neutral stimuli is not only observed in RT 
measures, but also evident in psychophysiological measures. One such measure in EEG 
research is the lateralized N2pc component, which has been argued to reflect on the 
attentional orienting to a stimulus in the contralateral visual field (Mazza, Turatto, & 
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Caramazza, 2009). An N2pc waveform has been shown in response to threatening IAPS 
pictures, whereas no N2pc was observed for non-threatening IAPS pictures (Kappenman 
et al., 2015). In similar vein, Eimer and Kiss (2007) have observed an N2pc in response to 
angry but not neutral face distractors. Prioritized attention to threats over neutral stimuli 
has also been supported by eye-movement data. For example, potentially threatening 
spider targets have been shown to be fixated more rapidly than non-threatening 
mushroom and flower targets (Gerdes, Pauli, & Alpers, 2009). It has also been shown that 
it takes longer to make an eye-movement away from a face presented at fixation when it 
has a threatening expression as compared to a neutral expression (Belopolsky, Devue, & 
Theeuwes, 2011). Overall, prioritized attention has been established for a multitude of 
potentially threatening stimuli (especially spiders, snakes, and angry faces) and with a 
multitude of measures (RTs, eye-movements, and Event Related Potentials in EEG). The 
question that remains is how exactly these threats are prioritized for attention.  
 
Theories of prioritized threat processing. 
 Prioritized attention to threat is in line with theories of threat processing that 
propose that throughout evolutionary history animals have developed a specialized threat 
module that rapidly detects and responds to threats. The threat module is grounded in a 
specialized subcortical circuitry that has been argued to provide an avenue for more rapid 
processing than the standard cortical route (Gross & Sabino Canteras, 2012; LeDoux, 
1996; Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Van Le et al., 2016). Such a threat module is proposed to 
centre around the amygdala and include multiple subcortical structures, including but not 
limited to the hippocampus, the Bed Nucleus of the Stria Terminalis (BNST), and the 
Pulvinar/thalamus (see e.g. Low Road; LeDoux, 1996; 2015). The majority of support for 
such a specialized circuitry comes from rodent research on the acquisition and extinction 
of fear-responses to conditioned stimuli (see e.g. Apps & Strata, 2015; Bentz & Schiller, 
2015; Calhoon & Tye, 2015; Gross & Sabino Canteras, 2012; Karalis et al., 2016; Li et al., 
2013; Tovote, Fadok, & Lüthi, 2015; Van Le et al., 2016).  
Whereas most theories of threat processing do not distinguish between the different 
processes involved in threat processing, research on monkeys has shown that the threat 
module plays a vital role in prioritized attention to threat. For example, Dal Monte and 
colleagues (2015) have shown that monkeys with amygdala lesions show a reduction in 
attentional orienting to potential threats. The threat module has also been extended into 
human models of threat processing, with notable theories in psychology and neuroscience 
including LeDoux’s Low Road Model and Öhman & Mineka’s (2001) Fear Module. The 
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threat module as conceptualized by these theories is proposed to interrupt ongoing (goal-
directed) attention when a threat is detected and re-orient attention to the threat (Mathews 
& Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). A major 
characteristic of such a threat module is that it has been suggested to operate in a 
stimulus-driven manner independent from cognitive control (e.g. due to its origin in animals 
with primitive brains prior to the development of neocortex). Only the model proposed by 
Mathews and Mackintosh proposes that activity in the threat module may be up- or down-
regulated, to a degree, by cognitive control processes. However, such top-down processes 
are not explicitly modelled even in this model. 
A driving role for stimulus threat value in prioritized attention to threat has been 
strengthened by studies showing prioritized attention to upright angry faces but not to 
these same faces when inverted (Fox, Lester, Russo, Bowles, Pichler, & Dutton, 2000). 
Inversion of a face has been argued to eliminate (or at least decrease) the threat value of 
the face since inversion impairs holistic processing, whilst individual stimulus features are 
identical (Tanaka & Farah, 1993). However, a recent study by Savage and Lipp (2015) has 
demonstrated rapid detection of upright and inverted angry faces and thus indicates that 
such an effect may be feature-driven. 
Processing of threat in a manner that is independent from cognitive, top-down 
control as proposed by the threat module would imply that attention is oriented to potential 
threats irrespective of an organism its immediate goals or conscious awareness of the 
threat. In line with such a notion, several seminal neuroimaging studies have shown that 
even subliminally presented threatening faces activate the threat module, especially the 
amygdala (Whalen, Rauch, & Etcoff, 1998; Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1998). However, 
other studies have contrasted such findings and observed that amygdala responding to 
threats is contingent on conscious awareness of the threat (Pessoa, Japee, Sturman, & 
Ungerleider, 2006).  
In daily life, such stimulus-driven allocation of attention to threat is not necessarily 
beneficial and could even endanger survival (Calhoon & Tye, 2015; Chun, Golomb, & 
Turk-Browne, 2011; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). If we return to the example of the 
spider on the dashboard, stimulus-driven attention to this spider likely comes at little to no 
cost when you are a passenger in the car. However, if you are the driver who is navigating 
a busy urban road with cars changing lanes, braking and speeding up, the appearance of 
a spider on your dashboard at the same time that a traffic light turns red could have far 
reaching consequences. Orienting to the spider may cause you to miss the traffic light that 
turned red and thus aid neither goal-completion nor survival. The question that arises then 
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is how does our attentional system deal with such situations where stimulus- and goal-
driven processes are at odds with one another?  
It appears at first sight that the majority of theories on threat processing suggest 
that attention may be prioritized towards the potential threat regardless of the organism’s 
current top-down goals. Thus in the driving example, one could wonder whether, if the 
spider is judged to be sufficiently threatening to be attended while in the passengers’ seat, 
it may also be expected to be attended when you’re in the drivers’ seat and have to pay 
attention to traffic. 
 
Theories of attention 
Attentional allocation as largely unaffected by top-down goals is at odds with 
research on attention to simple stimuli (e.g. bars and letters). In a seminal study Folk, 
Remington, and Johnston (1992) demonstrated that whether attention is oriented to a 
distractor is contingent on whether the distractor shares a feature that is relevant to the 
current task-goal. Specifically, they demonstrated that an onset cue slowed target 
responding more than a color cue when the target was defined by its sudden onset. 
However, when the target was defined by its color, the opposite pattern was observed 
such that a color cue slowed target responding more (Experiment 3; Folk et al., 1992). 
Top-down goals have also been shown to modulate neural activity to simple stimuli in e.g. 
the superior colliculi (Fecteau, Bell, & Munoz, 2004) and affect whether an N2pc 
component is observed (e.g. an N2pc waveform to the same stimulus is observed when it 
contains a goal-relevant feature only; Ansorge, Kiss, & Eimer, 2009).  
Generally speaking, theories of attention propose that stimulus processing is 
dependent on stimulus- as well as goal-driven processes (Treisman & Gelade, 1980; 
Wolfe, 1994). However, one important caveat in the context of the current thesis is, that 
such theories do not explicitly model attention to potential threats. For example, the 
Guided Search model which builds on earlier two-stage theories of attention (e.g. 
Treisman & Gelade, 1980) proposes two processing stages: an initial parallel stage of 
processing, where multiple stimuli can be processed at the same time but only a single 
stimulus can be initiated for further processing at a time, followed by a serial stage. The 
output of the early parallel stage of processing is proposed to guide the orienting of 
selective attention and is already proposed to be contingent on top-down and bottom-up 
processes (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Wolfe, 1994). In this way it is proposed that salient 
stimuli can guide orienting, but be further up- or down-modulated depending on their 
relevance to current top-down goals (Wolfe, 1994). Thus, according to attention theories, 
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attention may be oriented to a salient stimulus (e.g. a flashing light) while you are in the 
passenger seat of the car, but such stimulus-driven orienting is likely down-modulated 
when you’re in the driver’s seat and it would conflict with your top-down goal.  
 
Top-down modulation of attention to threat. 
 Few studies have addressed the question of whether top-down goals (i.e. the 
current task goal) can modulate stimulus-driven prioritized attention to threat as would be 
predicted by attention theories, or whether threat processing proceeds largely independent 
from current task goals as many theories of threat processing would propose. The only 
paradigm that, to some degree, allows a comparison of biased attention to threat when the 
threat is goal-relevant versus goal-irrelevant is the visual search paradigm. In visual 
search, multiple stimuli are presented simultaneously. One of these is the target that 
requires a response, whereas the remaining stimuli are distractors that do not require a 
response.  
Support for prioritized attention to goal-relevant threat is provided by studies 
showing speeded detection of a threat targets over emotionally-neutral targets when 
presented amongst non-emotional distractors (see e.g. Aue et al., 2013; see table 1 
‘interference by goal-relevant threat’). Support for prioritized attention to goal-irrelevant 
threat is provided by studies showing that a threat distractor slows responding to an 
emotionally-neutral target more than a neutral distractor (see e.g. Lipp & Waters, 2007; 
see Table 1 ‘interference by goal-irrelevant threat’). Table 1 provides an overview of visual 
search studies that assessed prioritized attention to animal threats. The table is organized 
by the relevance of the threat to the current task-goal and it provides some evidence that 
the goal relevance of the threat at hand may modulate attention. When the threat was 
goal-relevant, prioritized attention to such a threat was observed in 92% of the studies (11 
out of 12; see table 1). When the threat was goal-irrelevant, prioritized attention was 
observed in only 33% of the studies (4 out of 12) and this number only goes up slightly to 
50% when looking at high fearful participants (6 out 12).  
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Table 1. An overview of published Visual Search studies assessing prioritized attention to 
animal threats. Studies were included in the table if they compared RTs to pictorial animal 
threats with RTs to neutral non-threats (e.g. flowers). 
Study Interference by goal-irrelevant threats  
(i.e. threat distractors) 
 
Threat bias N =  4 
No threat bias N = 7 
 
Devue et al. (2011) Spider = butterfly (in both high and low fearful group) 
 
Gerdes et al (2008) Control: spider = flower/mushroom 
High spider fear: spider > flower/mushroom 
 
Lipp & Waters (2007) Spider > cockroach 
Snake > lizard 
 
Öhman et al. (2012) Spider & snake > mushroom  
Soares et al. (2012) Spider / snake = mushroom 
 
Weymar et al. (2014) Spider < butterfly 
i.e. bias in the opposite direction.  
 
Ouimet et al. (2012) Spider > beetle/butterfly/dragonfly 
 
Huang & Yeh (2011) Threat animal = Non-threat objects (e.g. chair) 
 
Purkis & Lipp (2007) Snake/spider = flower/mushroom 
Rinck et al. (2005) Some evidence for spider > beetle/butterfly 
Miltner et al. (2004) Low fear: Spider = flower 
High fear: spider > target 
 
Aue et al. (2013) Spider = bird  
Study Interference by goal-relevant threats 
(i.e. threat targets) 
 
Threat bias N =  11  
No threat bias N = 0 
 
Aue et al. (2013) Spider < bird 
 
Huang & Yeh (2011) Threat animal < Non-threat objects (e.g. chair) 
 
Lipp (2006) Spiders & snakes < flowers & mushrooms (but experiment 1. 
demonstrates such rapid detection is also observed for non-
threatening animals presented amongst flowers or 
mushrooms) 
 
Lipp et al. (2004) Spiders & snakes < flowers & mushrooms (but experiment 2. 
demonstrates such rapid detection may not be due to threat 
value) 
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LoBue (2010) Spider < mushrooms 
LoBue & Deloache (2011) Snakes < frogs, flowers 
Miltner et al. (2004) Spider > mushroom 
 
Ouimet et al. (2012) Spider < beetle/butterfly/dragonfly 
 
Purkis & Lipp (2007) Snakes/spider < flowers/mushrooms 
 
Rinck et al. (2005) Mixed evidence. Some evidence for spider < beetle / butterfly 
 
Soares et al. (2009) Spider / snake < mushrooms 
Weymar et al. (2014) Spider target < butterfly  (~100ms) | Np
2 .44 
 
 
Study Interference – unable to disentangle whether driven by 
goal-relevant or irrelevant threat 
(i.e. threat target amongst neutral distractors compared with 
neutral target amongst threat distractors) 
 
Threat bias N =  5 
No threat bias N = 0 
 
Broeren & Lester (2013)  
 
Spider target amongst grasshopper distractors < vice versa 
 
Öhman et al. (2001) Spider/snake amongst flower/mushroom < vice versa 
Shields et al. (2011) Spider/snake amongst flowers/mushrooms < vice versa 
 
 
Waters et al. (2008) Snakes/spider amongst flowers/mushrooms < vice versa  
Waters et al. (2011) Snake/spider amongst birds/fish < vice versa 
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However, such a comparison between goal-relevant and –irrelevant threats in visual 
search is confounded by whether a response to the threat is required, since the goal-
relevant threat always requires a response and the goal-irrelevant threat never does. 
Additionally, in most visual search studies, stimuli are presented until a response is made. 
In such a set-up, the (threat) distractor and the target can be attended sequentially and 
thus attending to a threat distractor does not prevent completion of the current goal. 
Consequently, such a set-up may not encourage the adoption of a strict top-down set for 
the target features. Consequently, even when one observes prioritized attention to a goal-
irrelevant threat in visual search this does not necessarily mean that prioritized attention to 
threat is unaffected by top-down processes. In order to assess the degree to which top-
down goals can modulate prioritized attention to threat, firstly one would need to employ a 
paradigm in which the adoption of a strict top-down set is encouraged. Subsequently, one 
can start to systematically manipulate the strength of bottom-up and top-down signals (e.g. 
the strength of the current task-goal or the salience of the threat stimulus) to delineate the 
boundary conditions of top-down influences on threat processing.  
To address these issues, in the current thesis I used a modified cueing paradigm 
that encouraged the adoption of a strict top-down set by presenting the threat distractor 
and target simultaneously for a brief period of time (50-100 ms). The thesis presents three 
experimental chapters that explore the influence of top-down processes on attention to 
potential threats using this paradigm. Critically, in these chapters I compare prioritized 
attention to a threat distractor (spiders) when its identity is goal-relevant (spider and cat 
targets) or goal-irrelevant (bird and fish targets). This eliminates the confound that was 
present in visual search studies where a stimulus its goal-relevance was confounded with 
whether it required a response. In the experiments described in the empirical chapters of 
this thesis, the threat distractor never requires a response regardless of its goal-relevance.  
 
Orienting and disengagement of attention 
The current thesis centrally examines the influence of top-down goals on two 
specific processes that have been implicated in prioritized attention to threats: 1) the pre-
attentive orienting of attention (i.e. capture) and 2) the disengagement of attention once a 
stimulus has been attended (i.e. prolonged dwell). The orienting of attention is defined as 
the allocation of spatial attention to a stimulus (e.g. a threatening or non-threatening 
target), whereas the disengagement of attention is defined as the de-allocation of attention 
away from an initially attended stimulus (e.g. a threatening or non-threatening distractor). 
Such a distinction between the pre-attentive orienting of attention and the disengagement 
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of focal attention was first introduced in a seminal paper by Posner and colleagues in 1984 
(Posner, Walker, Friedrich, & Rafal, 1984) and remains a central concept in attention 
research to date (see e.g. Carrasco, 2011). To highlight that the paradigm that was 
employed in this thesis assesses spatial attention, I have chosen to use the term orienting 
rather than engagement because the latter could also be understood to refer to the non-
spatial engagement of attention whereas this confusion does not apply to the term 
orienting. Disentangling the two processes is important because the pre-attentive orienting 
and the subsequent disengagement may differ in their susceptibility to goal-driven 
modulation (see e.g. Carrasco, 2011). For instance, according to LeDoux’ (1996) account, 
it is plausible that only the initial rapid orienting response may be unaffected by top-down 
goals (Low Road). Disengagement commences at a later stage and thus may be more 
readily influenced by top-down goals (High Road; see also Carrasco, 2011, for a similar 
view).  
Previous paradigms, like the visual search paradigm, struggle to disentangle these 
two attentional processes. For example, in visual search, rapid responding to threat targets 
is most likely due to the rapid orienting of attention to a potential threat. However, it is 
unclear whether slowed responses to a neutral target in the presence of a threat distractor 
are due to this threat capturing attention or delaying disengagement. For example, Öhman 
and colleagues (2012) showed that a spider or snake distractor slowed target responding 
more than a non-threatening mushroom distractor, but this study cannot attribute such a 
result to orienting or disengagement specifically. Gerdes and colleagues (2008) employed 
eye-tracking in a similar study to disentangle these two processes. They showed that 
slowed responding in the presence of a spider distractor in a spider fearful sample was not 
due to rapid orienting to the spider but instead driven by disengagement delays from 
spiders compared to non-threatening flowers and mushrooms.  
 One paradigm that has been employed to disentangle the covert orienting and 
disengagement of attention is the dot-probe paradigm. In the dot-probe paradigm two 
pictures, e.g. a threat and a neutral picture, are presented simultaneously on either side of 
fixation for a specified duration (e.g. 500 ms). Subsequently, a neutral target (e.g. a dot or 
arrow) is presented with equal likelihood in one of these two locations. If attention is 
prioritized towards the threat distractor, then RTs should be shorter when the target follows 
in the same spatial location as the threat compared to when it appear in the opposite 
location. In a seminal study MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata (1986) showed that RTs were 
shorter when the target appeared in the threat location. Such an effect could be driven by 
the threat distractor capturing attention more readily than the simultaneously presented 
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non-threat. Alternatively, once attended, the threat distractor may have delayed 
disengagement compared to the non-threat. In order to disentangle the two explanations, 
RTs on trials with a threat-neutral distractor-pair need to be compared to baseline trials 
where two neutral distractors were presented. If the threat distractor captures attention, 
RTs should be faster on treat-neutral trials where the target appears in the threat location 
compared to RTs on neutral-neutral trials. If the threat distractor delays disengagement, 
RTs on threat-neutral trials where the target appears in the non-threat location should be 
longer than RTs on neutral-neutral trials. Studies employing the dot-probe paradigm with 
neutral baseline trials have mainly provided evidence for delays in disengagement. For 
example, Koster and colleagues (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004b) did 
not observe prioritized attention to threat pictures. They did observe delayed 
disengagement from the threat distractor, since target responding was slower when the 
target was presented in the location opposite to the threat as compared to neutral-neutral 
trials. One issue with such dot-probe studies is that attention is allocated to the fixation 
cross at the beginning of each trial. Thus, each stimulus will have to attract attention 
before attention can be disengaged from it.  
The single cueing paradigm could be argued to provide a cleaner measure of 
disengagement. This paradigm differs from the dot-probe paradigm described before, in 
that only a single threat or non-threat distractor precedes the presentation of a neutral 
target. Consequently, the distractor is always characterized by a sudden onset and based 
on this onset the distractor should always capture attention regardless of its threat value 
(see e.g. Jonides & Yantis, 1988). In this paradigm, again the target can be presented in 
the same location as the threat distractor or in the opposite, non-cued, location. In similar 
vein, the target can be presented in the same location as the neutral distractor or in the 
opposite non-cued location. Prioritized orienting to threat would be deduced if target 
responding is faster when the target is cued by the threat compared to the non-threat.  
However, given that one would expect all cues to capture attention regardless of 
their threat value, due to their salient onset, this paradigm may not be very sensitive to 
measuring prioritized orienting to threat distractors over non-threat distractor (Mathews, 
Fox, Yiend, & Calder, 2003). Koster and colleagues (2006) showed that RTs to a neutral 
target were faster when it was validly-cued by a threat than when it was validly-cued by a 
non-threat, though only in high trait anxious individuals. However, several studies have 
failed to observe rapid orienting. For example, Fox, Russo, and Dutton (2002) showed that 
RTs to a neutral target did not differ on validly cued trials depending on whether the cue 
was an angry or a neutral face. Delays in disengagement would be deduced if target 
  14 
responding is slower when the target is presented in the non-cued location opposite from 
the threat as compared to the non-threat distractor. This was demonstrated for example by 
Koster and colleagues (2004) who showed that RTs were slower when the target 
appeared in the non-cued location following a threat distractor compared to a non-threat 
distractor. Several studies, including, Fox and colleagues (2002) and Yiend and Mathews 
(2001), have demonstrated such an increase in RTs with invalid threat cues as compared 
to neutral cues. 
The dot-probe paradigm and single cueing paradigm as described above have 
made great strides in disentangling orienting and disengagement. However, it can be 
argued that a cleaner way of disentangling orienting and disengagement is to manipulate 
the locus of attention before the threat distractor is presented such that it is initially 
attended on some trials and initially unattended on others. When attention is already at the 
threat location prior to threat presentation, one can measure disengagement 
uncontaminated by orienting. On the other hand when attention is at a non-threat location 
when the threat appears, one can measure orienting. Attention can be controlled in to 
such an ends by presenting a neutral cue that shares a feature with the target people are 
searching for. For example, Folk and colleagues (1992) showed that a cue characterized 
by a sudden onset attracted attention when looking for an onset target, and a color cue 
when looking for a color target.  
 
The current thesis  
In the experiments described in my thesis, I employ a modified cueing paradigm 
that controls allocation of attention before the threat is presented. I do this by presenting 
four green dots around one of the four potential stimulus locations. This cue shares its 
color with the green target that participants look for and thus directs attention (see 
contingent capture literature; e.g. Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992). The effectiveness 
of the cue in directing attention can be confirmed in each experiment by ensuring RTs on 
target-cued trials are shorter than on non-target-cued trials. The threat distractors (spiders) 
are then presented in the cued location on some trials and in non-cued locations on other 
trials. Thus, disengagement from threat can be assessed on trials where the threat 
distractor is cued, whereas attentional capture can be assessed on trials where the threat 
is presented in a non-cued location. A similar approach has recently been taken by 
Grafton and MacLeod (2014) who employed an onset cue presented before the standard 
double cueing trials in a dot probe task (e.g. two pictures differing in valence followed by a 
neutral target). However, in their paradigm threat distractor and target are presented 
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sequentially reducing competition for attentional resources and thus making their set-up 
less suitable for studying top-down effects.  
Moreover, only the modified cueing paradigm that I employ in my thesis, allows for 
a neat manipulation of the goal-relevance of the threat distractor by rendering its identity 
task-relevant or irrelevant. This is difficult to do in dot-probe and single cueing paradigms 
where the threat is always task-irrelevant. To assess prioritized attention to a goal-
irrelevant threat distractor, the threat distractor (spider) would have an identify that was 
dissimilar to the potential targets (e.g. bird and fish). To assess prioritized attention to the 
same threat when it was goal-relevant, the threat distractor (spider) would have an identify 
that was similar to the potential targets (e.g. spider and cat). 
According to strong theories of threat processing (Öhman & Mineka, 2001) both the 
early orienting of attention (automaticity hypothesis) and the subsequent disengagement 
(encapsulation hypothesis) should be largely unaffected by top-down goals. According to 
weaker theories of encapsulation, orienting should be largely unaffected by a threat its 
goal-relevance, whereas disengagement may or may not be subject to top-down 
processes as even threats would be eventually cognitively evaluated (see e.g. high road; 
LeDoux, 1995). According to theories of attention both processes should be affected by 
top-down goals but their respective susceptibility to goal-driven modulation may differ (see 
e.g. Carrasco, 2011). 
In Chapter 2, I demonstrate that the disengagement of focal attention from a threat 
is modulated by the current top-down task-goal. Specifically a disengagement delay from 
the threat distractor is observed when it is relevant to the current task-goal but not when it 
is irrelevant to the task-goal. This chapter thus suggests that threat processing, once 
initiated, is not unaffected by top-down goals. In Chapter 3, I demonstrate that the pre-
attentive orienting of attention to a threat is modulated by top-down task-goals. Specifically 
rapid orienting to the threat distractor is observed when it is relevant to the current task-
goal, but much reduced when both are irrelevant to the task at hand. In fact, when it is 
goal-irrelevant, the threat distractor only captures attention when the cued distractor 
provides relatively little competition for attentional resources. This chapter thus provides 
evidence against stronger versions of a threat module which hold that the initiation of 
prioritized attention to threat is unaffected by top-down goals. Finally, in Chapter 4, I 
demonstrate that rapid orienting to threat is contingent on stimulus-specific fear and limited 
time-on-task. The findings from the three chapters converge on the conclusion that 
relatively later as well as earlier attentional processes are contingent on current task-goals. 
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Pilot experiments 
In the lead-up to the modified spatial cueing paradigm as described in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis, I conducted multiple pilot experiments to fine-tune experimental 
parameters. In all of these experiments I used either animal silhouettes similar to those 
employed in chapter 2 of the thesis or letter stimuli. In all experiments, at least 12 
participants were tested. In two initial experiments with letters or animal silhouettes, stimuli 
were presented until a response was made. In these experiments no prioritized attention 
was observed to the threat distractor. The cue effectively controlled attention, as RTs were 
significantly faster on validly-cued trials than on invalidly-cued trials. Importantly, when 
stimuli were presented until response, no additional slowing was observed for letter 
distractors that had a target-similar identity but non-target color (i.e. foil) compared to letter 
distractors with a non-target identity and non-target color. This seemed potentially 
problematic, as it could indicate that distractor identity was simply not processed in the 
modified cueing paradigm with the parameters as initially implemented. Alternatively, the 
presentation of all stimuli until response may have caused the identity of all distractors to 
be processed fully regardless of their (threat) identity. Consequently, this could have 
rendered the paradigm relatively insensitive to effects of stimulus identity (e.g. foil or threat 
value). The main difference between spatial cueing paradigms where such a foil effect is 
generally observed and my pilot experiments was that such previous experiments 
presented time-limited stimulus displays. Subsequently, to ensure some objective measure 
of the fact that stimulus identity was indeed processed (i.e. produce a foil effect), I 
shortened stimulus presentation to 50-100 ms, in line with previous spatial cueing studies 
employing simple stimuli (e.g. letters or shapes). This indeed led to a foil effect for both the 
letter and animal tasks, thus providing an objective measure that stimulus identity was 
processed at least to some degree. Subsequently, I ran a pilot version of the experiments 
where I reduced the salience of the target and cue by presenting them in grey instead of 
green as an additional means of encouraging the processing of stimulus identity. With this 
adjustment distractor identity again seemed to be processed but error rates were high 
(>30%). Subsequently, I reverted to the green cue and target in subsequent (pilot) 
experiments. Another pilot experiment was conducted to test optimal stimulus size and 
location from fixation. Based on the results of these experiments, stimuli were reduced in 
size and presented closer to fixation. I also ran a pilot study where I used snake instead of 
spider distractors. This experiment yielded difficult to interpret data as there seemed to be 
some prioritized attention (numerically), but this effect did not reach significance and 
results were highly variable across participants.   
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Chapter 2 - The spider does not always win the fight for attention: Disengagement 
from threat is modulated by goal set. 
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Abstract 
Stimulus-driven preferential attention to threat can be modulated by goal-driven attention 
(Hahn & Gronlund, 2007; Van Dillen, Lakens, & Van den Bos, 2011; Vogt, De Houwer, 
Crombez, & Van Damme, 2013). However, it remains unclear how this goal-driven 
modulation affects specific attentional components implied in threat interference. We 
hypothesize that goal-driven modulation most strongly impacts delayed disengagement 
from threat. A spatial cueing task was used that disentangles delayed disengagement from 
attentional capture by tightly manipulating the locus of attention at the time of target onset. 
Different top-down goals were induced by instructing participants to identify bird/fish 
targets (Experiment 1) or spider/cat targets (Experiment 2) among animal non-targets. 
Delayed disengagement from a non-target spider was observed only when the spider was 
part of the target set, not when it was task-irrelevant. This corroborates evidence that 
threat stimuli do not necessarily override goal-driven attentional control and that extended 
processing of threatening distractors is not obligatory. 
Keywords: threat, fear, attention, goal-driven, stimulus-driven 
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The spider does not always win the fight for attention: Disengagement from threat is 
modulated by goal set. 
We are generally able to exert control over where we direct our attention. However, 
objects in the visual world will, at times, drive our attention.  By its nature this stimulus-
driven attention may act in opposition to the goal-driven (i.e. top-down) control of attention. 
An ongoing debate on the nature of attentional control has raised the question whether 
attention to salient distracter stimuli is involuntary and driven solely by stimulus properties 
such as abrupt onsets (Schreij, Theeuwes, & Olivers, 2010; Yantis & Jonides, 1984), color, 
and salience (e.g. Belopolsky, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2010; Posner, 1980; Theeuwes, 
1994;), or is modulated by task goals. For example, salient but irrelevant distractors in 
spatial cueing have been shown to capture attention only when they contained a target 
feature (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992). Folk et al. showed that a single abrupt-onset 
distractor captured attention if the target was a single abrupt-onset stimulus, but not when 
the target was a color singleton. Conversely, a color singleton distractor captured attention 
if the target was a color singleton, but not when the target was a single stimulus defined by 
its abrupt onset. Consequently, it has been argued that attentional capture is contingent on 
an attentional control setting for task-relevant properties (contingent attentional capture; 
Folk et al.). A large number of subsequent studies (e.g. Dombrowe, Donk, & Olivers, 2011; 
Eimer, Kiss, Press, & Sauter, 2009; Folk, Remington, & Wu, 2009; Irons, Folk, & 
Remington, 2011; Wolfe, Butcher, Lee, & Hyle, 2003) have supported that one’s 
attentional set modulates distractor interference, thus advocating top-down modulation of 
attentional interference. 
Against the background of the debate on the nature of attentional control, a series 
of studies have proposed that attention to threat stimuli is special and not subject to top-
down goal-related control that has been shown to modulate attention to other stimulus 
categories (e.g., abrupt luminance transients). Threat stimuli (e.g. spiders) have been 
shown to interfere with the task-relevant allocation of attention in high as well as low 
anxious volunteers. In visual search, threat targets are found faster than neutral targets 
(e.g. Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; Rinck, Reinecke, Ellwart, Heuer, & Becker, 2005) 
and search for neutral targets is slower in the presence of threat distractors (e.g. Lipp & 
Waters, 2007). In studies using the dot-probe, responses to a neutral target are faster 
when it is displayed in the same location as a previously presented (non-informative) 
threat cue compared to when it is presented in the same location as a non-threat cue 
(Mogg & Bradley, 2006; Lipp & Derakshan, 2005).  
The finding that threat stimuli can disrupt the goal-driven allocation of attentional 
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resources has been interpreted repeatedly as support for an involuntary, bottom-up driven 
interference with goal directed attention (e.g. Isbell, 2006; LoBue & DeLoache, 2008; Luo 
et al., 2010; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). This proposed bottom-up driven interference is 
generally presumed to be mediated by a fast, subcortical route responsible for processing 
threat stimuli (LeDoux, 1996; 2000). The absence of goal-related top-down modulation of 
threat-related interference is advocated perhaps most strongly in the fear module account 
(Öhman & Mineka). This account as well as more recent neuroscience accounts (e.g. Luo 
et al.) propose that the fear system is (largely) encapsulated from top-down modulation. 
However, a number of recent studies have indicated that threat-related interference can be 
influenced by top-down goals. These studies show that threat interference is not observed 
when participants’ goals compete with preferential attention to threat stimuli (Hahn & 
Gronlund, 2007; Van Dillen et al., 2011; Vogt et al., 2013). Hahn and Gronlund showed 
that preferential attention to angry faces in visual search is modulated by top-down search 
goals: Angry faces received preferential attention (over happy faces) when they were the 
target but not when they were the distracter irrelevant to the task goal. In the same vein, 
using the dot-probe paradigm Vogt et al. showed that directly goal-relevant stimuli 
received preferential attention over threat stimuli (indicating an imminent burst of white 
noise). In line with these studies, the current study assesses whether threat interference 
can be modulated by top-down goals by varying top-down task goals across experiments.  
Moreover, the current study was designed to disentangle whether threat 
interference reflects attentional capture by threat (the rapid initial orienting of attention 
towards a threat stimulus) or delayed attentional disengagement (the slowed subsequent 
withdrawal of attention from threat; see e.g. Brockmole & Boot, 2009).  
Much of the previous research on threat-related interference has studied the effects of 
threat stimuli on an aggregate of attentional processes and has not been diagnostic to the 
distinction between effects of threat capture and disengagement. This in part reflects on a 
failure to control the locus of attention at trial onset in most experimental paradigms, i.e. 
attention could be at the location of the threat stimulus or elsewhere (Fox et al., 2001; Fox, 
Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Hahn & Gronlund, 2007; Lipp & Waters, 2007; Yiend & Mathews, 
2001). For example, Hahn and Gronlund showed that the presence of an angry face 
distracter in visual search slowed target responses, but this could be due to the threat 
distracter capturing attention or it delaying disengagement once attended.  
Endeavoring to dissociate attentional capture and delayed disengagement, Fox et 
al. employed an exogenous cueing paradigm where a single cue (angry or neutral face) 
was presented in one of two possible locations and followed by a neutral target (a square 
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or circle) in either the cued location (valid trials) or non-cued location (invalid trials). On 
valid trials, target detection was unaffected by cue valence, which could be interpreted as 
evidence against speeded attentional capture by threat cues. However, given that neutral 
target stimuli were characterized by abrupt onsets, the contingent capture account (Folk et 
al., 1992) would predict that any cue characterized by an abrupt onset would capture 
attention. As both angry and neutral face cues had an abrupt onset they would both be 
expected to capture attention and a failure to find superior capture by angry face cues as 
compared to neutral face cues could simply indicate that both cues captured attention 
efficiently, leaving no room for superior capture by to threat cues (Todd & van Gelder, 
1979). Additionally, the study used a cue target asynchrony of 300 ms, a window long 
enough for multiple attentional processes to take place, increasing the likelihood that the 
paradigm may not provide a sensitive measure of capture. On invalid trials, target 
detection was significantly slower following threat cues, taken to indicate slowed 
disengagement from threat cues. However, Mogg, Holmes, Garner, and Bradley (2008) 
questioned whether this differential response slowing could reflect on differences in motor 
processes as well as effects of spatial attention. Subsequent studies have claimed 
evidence for slowed disengagement from threat stimuli (Belopolsky, Devue, & Theeuwes, 
2011; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004), whereas some studies have 
also claimed evidence for speeded capture by threat (West, Anderson, & Pratt, 2009; 
Yiend, 2010). However, the results provided are difficult to interpret as these studies did 
not control the (initial) allocation of attention, making it difficult to disentangle capture and 
disengagement reliably. 
It also remains unexplored whether attentional capture and attentional 
disengagement are differentially affected by stimulus-driven and goal-driven processes. 
The current study addressed this question in a cuing paradigm that allows for the 
disentanglement of attentional capture and disengagement while simultaneously varying 
task goals so that the threat stimulus is either part of the target set or not. We used a 
spatial cueing paradigm based on Folk et al. (1992) in which subjects searched for a green 
animal silhouette among three white non-target animal silhouettes. On some trials one of 
the white, non-target stimuli was the threat stimulus (spider silhouette). Prior to target 
presentation, a target-colored cue (four green dots) was presented around one possible 
target location. According to contingent capture theory, attention should be allocated to the 
target-color cue location producing a cueing effect and consequently response time should 
be faster when the subsequent target appears at the cued location rather than at one of 
the other locations. If the threat stimulus automatically captures attention, irrespective of 
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top-down set, then trials on which it is present as a non-target should show little or no 
advantage for the cued location, as attention will have been drawn away from the cued 
location to the threat stimulus. In addition, if threat stimuli delay the disengagement of 
attention, then it should take longer to respond to the target presented at a non-cued 
location when the threat stimulus occurs at the cued location compared to a non-threat 
stimulus. The target display was presented briefly (47 ms) to create a task that was 
attentionally demanding and to make it difficult to attend to all 4 silhouettes sequentially 
before making a target response. In such a task set-up stimuli will have to compete for 
attentional resources which is critical to observing attentional interference according to 
biased competition models (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Yiend, 2010).  
In Experiment 1, we assessed whether a threat-related non-target silhouette (white 
spider) would interfere with target identification more than a non-threat non-target 
silhouette (white cat) when the target set (bird versus fish) did not include the spider. If the 
spider silhouette captured attention, then it should slow target responses when present at 
any location in the display. If attention takes longer to disengage from the spider 
silhouette, then it should slow target responses when presented at the cued location to 
which attention has been drawn.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
 Participants. 
Twenty University of Queensland students (17 women; age range = 17-24 years, M 
= 19 years) volunteered in Experiment 1 in return for course credit. Their fear of spiders 
was assessed with the Spider Phobia Questionnaire (SPQ; Klorman, Hastings, Weerts, 
Melamed, & Lang, 1974). The SPQ is a self-report questionnaire that consists of 31 
true/false items concerning spiders. The total score can range from 0-31, with higher 
scores indicating more fear of spiders. The total SPQ scores in the current experiment 
ranged from 2 to 24 (M = 13.10; SD = 6.91). These scores are indicative of a sample in 
which a number of volunteers likely suffer from arachnophobia, while the majority of 
volunteers display a wide range of non-clinical spider fear (Fredrickson, 1983; Muris & 
Merkelbach, 1996). No participants were excluded based on their SPQ score. 
Materials and apparatus 
 The target stimuli were two green animal silhouettes, one depicting a bird and one 
depicting a fish (see Figure 1 for an example). The non-target stimuli were five white 
animal silhouettes, one each depicting a bird, fish (identical to the green target silhouettes, 
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except in color), a horse, cat, and spider. The animals were equated in size (M = 505 
pixels) and presented on a black background. Each target and distractor silhouette was 
displayed within a placeholder box. Placeholder boxes were defined by a white outline 
consisting of 114 x 88 pixels and measuring 3 x 2.6 cm. The spatial cue consisted of the 
outline of one of the boxes turning green with four green dots appearing around this box. 
The color of the spatial cue was identical to that of the target animals. As the cue contains 
the critical element (green color) on which target identification is based, the cue should 
produce a reliable cueing effect on target identification time even though it is uninformative 
as to the actual target location. Stimulus presentation was controlled by DMDX (Forster & 
Forster, 2003). Stimuli were presented on a Dell Optiplex 780 computer with a 16-in. color 
monitor, a resolution of 1,024 x 768 pixels, and a refresh rate of 85Hz. 
 
 
Figure 1. A trial in the spatial cueing task in experiments 1 and 2 consisted of the following 
display sequence: fixation display, cue display, fixation display, target display, blank 
screen.  The depicted trial is an invalid spider-cued trial with a fish target from Experiment 
1. 
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Procedure. 
 During a single session participants completed a computerized spatial cueing task 
followed by a pen-and-paper version of the SPQ (Klorman et al., 1974) used to assess 
fear of spiders. Participants were informed that a spider, cat, horse, bird, and fish 
silhouette would be depicted during the spatial cueing task.  
 Spatial cueing task. 
Throughout each trial, a central fixation cross and four placeholder boxes were 
presented in a cross-like arrangement (see Figure 1). Each placeholder box was 
positioned with its nearest corner 6 cm away from the center of the fixation cross. Each 
trial consisted of three different displays presented in a sequence of 5 frames as shown in 
Figure 1. The fixation display consisted of the central fixation cross and four rectangular 
boxes. The cue display was identical to the fixation display with the cue - 4 green dots - 
displayed around one of the four boxes with equal probability. The target display consisted 
of the fixation display with four animal silhouettes, one depicted in each box. On each trial, 
three white non-target silhouettes and one green target silhouette were displayed. The 
bird, fish, and horse silhouettes were presented on each trial whereas the spider and cat 
silhouettes were presented on half of the trials. The bird silhouette was the target on half 
of the trials and the fish silhouette on the remaining and the animal that was not the target 
was displayed as a non-target. Horse, spider, and cat silhouettes were always non-targets. 
The different silhouettes were displayed with equal probability in each box. Depending on 
which silhouette was displayed in the cued box, four types of trials can be distinguished. 
On valid-cued trials a green target silhouette was displayed in the cued box. On invalid 
horse-cued and invalid spider/cat-cued trials a white non-target silhouette - horse, spider, 
or cat respectively - was displayed in the cued box. On foil-cued trials a silhouette with a 
target identity - bird or fish - but non-target color - white - was displayed in the cued box. 
Figure 1 shows an example of an invalid spider-cued trial with a fish target. Each 
participant completed 12 practice and 96 test trials. Valid-, invalid horse-, invalid 
spider/cat-, and foil-cued trials each made up 25% (24 trials) of the total number of trials. 
Trial presentation order was randomized for each participant.  
Each trial started with the fixation display, presented for 882 ms. Then the cue 
display was presented for 82 ms followed by the fixation display for 82 ms. Subsequently, 
the target display was presented for 47 ms. Each trial ended with the presentation of a 
blank screen for 882 ms (see Figure 1). Participants were instructed to indicate as quickly 
and accurately as possible whether the green target silhouette was a bird or a fish by 
pressing the left or right shift keys. Allocation of target animal to shift key was 
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counterbalanced across participants. From the moment of target presentation participants 
had a maximum of 2,900 ms to make a response. Response feedback (correct or 
incorrect) was given on practice trials only.  
Results 
The average target identification time for each condition is presented in Figure 2. A 
4 [Cued Item: valid, invalid-horse, invalid-spider/cat, foil] × 2 [Threat: spider distracter, cat 
distracter] repeated measures ANOVA on target identification time showed a main effect of 
Cued Item, F(3,17) = 15.477, p < .001, partial η2 = .732. Target identification was faster on 
valid-cued than on invalid cued trials (horse cued: t(19) = 4.311, p < .001; spider/cat cued: 
t(19) = 4.806, p < .001). Thus the cue was effective in manipulating attention. Also, target 
identification was slower on foil-cued than on invalid spider/cat-cued trials (t(19) = 2.239, p 
= .037). This indicates that cued silhouettes displayed in the non-target color interfered 
more with target identification when they had a target identity (foils) compared to when 
they had a non-target identity. The ANOVA showed no main effect for Threat, F(1,19) = 
.782, p = .388, partial η2 = .040, nor the expected Cued Item by Threat interaction, F(3,17) 
= .818, p = .502, partial η2 = .126. No difference was observed between trials on which a 
spider and cat non-target silhouette was presented, regardless of whether the spider/cat 
silhouette was cued or not (valid cued: t(19) = .886, p = .386; invalid horse cued: t(19) = 
1.934, p = . 068, invalid spider/cat cued: t(19) = .507, p = .618; foil cued: t(19) = .541, p = 
.595). Thus, Experiment 1 provided no evidence for delayed disengagement from or 
speeded capture by the spider silhouette distracter.  
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Figure 2. Average target identification time for valid-cued, invalid horse-cued, invalid 
spider/cat-cued, and foil-cued trials with a spider versus cat distracter in Experiment 1. ** = 
p < .01. 
 
Experiment 2 
The absence of spider interference in Experiment 1 indicates that it is possible to 
maintain an attentional set for color in the presence of a threat stimulus. This finding is not 
in line with the notion that threat stimuli will necessarily capture attention or interfere with 
top down attentional set. Instead, it suggests that subjects can ignore threat stimuli when 
they are able to use a neutral feature (color) to determine where the target is. That is, an 
attentional set for the task-relevant property can override the response to a threat stimulus. 
This is consistent with previous evidence for goal-driven modulation of capture by threat-
relevant stimuli (Hahn & Gronlund, 2007; Van Dillen et al., 2011; Vogt et al., 2013). In the 
current paradigm, these results could be taken to mean that the emotional content of the 
spider silhouette could be ignored. When subjects can select on the basis of color it may 
be possible for attention to focus narrowly on the item with the target color, effectively 
short-circuiting the deeper analysis of the non-targets to reveal semantic or emotional 
content. However, what if the spider would be included in the target set? Evidence 
suggests that in similar spatial cueing paradigms with threat-neutral stimuli, the identity of 
  28 
attended non-targets can slow response times to identify a target when they are 
incompatible with the response to be made (Remington, Folk, & McLean, 2001; Remington 
& Folk, 2001; Lachter, Remington, & Ruthruff, 2009). In Experiment 2 we explore whether 
the emotional content of an attended item will interfere with target identification when the 
item is part of the target set. Additionally, we collected threat ratings for the silhouettes to 
confirm that spider silhouettes are more threatening than cat, bird, and fish silhouettes. In 
Experiment 2 the target and distractor animals from Experiment 1 were switched, 
rendering the spider part of the target set. Thus, in Experiment 2, we assessed whether 
the same threat-related spider silhouette distracter would interfere with target identification 
when the green target set (spider versus cat) did include the spider. The non-target spider 
and cat silhouette again could be presented at the cued (attended) location, as well as a 
non-cued (unattended) location. 
Method 
 Participants. 
Twenty University of Queensland students (16 women; age range = 17-26 years, M 
= 19 years) volunteered in Experiment 2 in return for course credit. Their scores on the 
SPQ (Klorman et al., 1974) ranged from 0 to 27 (M = 11.75; SD = 7.53).  This distribution 
of scores on the SPQ is indicative of a sample in which a number of volunteers may suffer 
from spider phobia, while the majority of volunteers display a wide range of non-clinical 
spider fear (Fredrickson, 1983; Muris & Merkelbach, 1996). No participants were excluded 
based on their SPQ score. 
Procedure. 
 In addition to the spatial cueing task and the SPQ (Klorman et al., 1974) 
participants also completed threat and arousal ratings for all silhouettes.  
Spatial Cueing Task. 
The procedure and spatial cueing task in this experiment were identical to 
Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. Instead of green bird and fish target 
silhouettes, we used green spider and cat target silhouettes. The white horse silhouette 
was no longer included, because a spider and a cat silhouette (one being the target, the 
other being a non-target) were presented on each trial. This set-up resulted in three 
different trial types. On valid-cued trials the green target silhouette - spider or cat - was 
presented in the cued box. On invalid-cued trials (50%) a white non-target silhouette - bird 
or fish - was presented in the cued box. On foil-cued trials (25%) a silhouette with a target 
identity – spider or cat - but non-target color - white - was presented in the cued box. Valid- 
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and foil-cued trials each made up 25% (24 trials) of the 96 trials, while invalid-cued trials 
made up 50% (48 trials).  
Silhouette ratings. 
The pen and paper silhouette questionnaire consisted of the spider, cat, bird, and 
fish silhouettes as used in the spatial cueing task. Each silhouette was followed by 2 
questions: ‘How scary do you find this stimulus?’ and ‘how arousing do you find this 
stimulus?’. Participants answered each question by putting a mark on a 17 cm Visual 
Analogue Scale (VAS) ranging from ‘Not at all scary’ to Very scary’ or ‘Not at all arousing’ 
to ‘Very arousing’. Ratings were scored by measuring the number of millimetres from the 
leftmost point of the scale to a participant’s mark and not subjected to transformations. 
Therefore higher numbers reflect silhouettes that were rated as more threatening/arousing.  
Results  
Silhouette ratings. 
Spider silhouettes (M = 47.650, SD = 45.535) were rated as more threatening than 
cat (M = 11.950, SD = 21.751; t(19) = 3.780, p < .05), bird (M = 16.050, SD = 32.263; t(19) 
= 3.279, p < .05), and fish silhouettes (M = 8.200, SD = 18.572; t(19) = 4.108, p < .05), 
while the other silhouettes did not differ from one another in rated threat value (cat versus 
bird: t(19) = 1.062, p = .301; cat versus fish: t(19) = 1.430, p = .169; bird versus fish: t(19) 
= 1.399, p = .178). Spider silhouettes were rated as more arousing (M = 40.550, SD = 
36.203) than fish silhouettes (M = 21.350, SD = 34.139; t(19) = 2.205, p < .05), and there 
was a trend towards them being more arousing than cat (M = 24.800, SD = 23.025; t(19) = 
2.013, p = .058) and bird silhouettes (M = 26.550, SD = 31.683; t(19) = 2.205, p = .058). 
The other silhouettes did not differ from one another in rated arousal value (cat versus 
bird: t(19) = .327, p = .747; cat versus fish: t(19) = .566, p = .578; bird versus fish: t(19) = 
.574, p = .572).  
Reaction time data. 
Average target identification times for all conditions are presented in Figure 3. A 3 
[Cued Item: valid, invalid, foil] × 2 [Threat: spider distracter, cat distracter] repeated 
measures ANOVA on target identification time again showed a main effect of Cued Item, 
F(2,18) = 11.895, p < .01, partial η2 = .569. 
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Figure 3. Average target identification time for valid-cued, invalid-cued, and foil-cued trials 
with a spider versus cat distracter in Experiment 2. ** = p < .01. 
 
Relative to invalid trials, target identification was faster on valid-cued trials (t(19) = 
4.870, p < .001) and slower on foil-cued trials (t(19) = 4.856, p < .001). No main effect of 
Threat was observed, F(1,19) = 3.847, p = .065, partial η2 = .168, providing no support for 
overall spider silhouette interference. However, the expected Cued Item × Threat 
interaction, F(2,18) = 5.673, p < .05, partial η2 = .387, was observed. On invalid trials (fish 
or bird silhouette presented in the cued location), no difference emerged between spider 
and cat non-target trials (t(19) = 1.377, p = .184). Thus, Experiment 2 provides no 
evidence for attentional capture by the non-target spider silhouette if it was not cued. 
However, when the spider and cat non-target silhouettes were displayed in the cued 
location (foil trials), the spider silhouette slowed down target identification more than did 
the cat silhouette (t(19) = 3.333, p = .003; see Figure 3). Thus, Experiment 2 provides 
evidence for slowed attentional disengagement from the cued non-target spider 
silhouette.1 
General Discussion 
The spider silhouette was rated as more threatening (and arousing) than all other 
animal silhouettes. Delayed attentional disengagement from the non-target spider was 
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observed when the spider was included in the target set (Experiment 2), but not when the 
spider was not included in the target set (Experiment 1)1. Thus, when the spider was not 
included in the target set, it did not slow target identification even when attention was 
already at its location. In contrast, when the spider was included in the target set, the non-
target spider did slow down target identification when it was presented at the cued 
location. These results indicate that delayed disengagement from a non-target spider was 
modulated by top-down attentional control and are inconsistent with solely bottom-up 
driven explanations of threat-related interference (Isbell, 2006; James, 1890; LoBue & 
DeLoache, 2008; Luo et al., 2010; Öhman & Mineka, 2001). The observed top-down 
modulation of delayed disengagement from threat is in line with explanations that allow for 
goal-driven modulation of attentional interference (e.g. Folk et al., 1992) and 
neuroscientific accounts that propose subcortical emotion processing as not encapsulated 
from cortical input (e.g. Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010; Tamietto & De Gelder, 2010).  
Attentional capture by the non-target spider silhouette was not observed in either of 
the two experiments. Thus, when attention was at a location other than that of the non-
target spider silhouette, the spider did not seem to affect target identification time in the 
current paradigm. This result does not preclude that capture would be observed if one 
were to employ a different paradigm or use more potent or realistic threat stimuli. Previous 
studies (Forbes, Purkis, & Lipp, 2010; Mermillod et al., 2010) have shown that threat-
related interference is observed regardless of whether the threat stimuli are silhouette or 
more detailed stimuli, indicating that increased stimulus simplicity does not eliminate 
threat-related interference. In contrast to the current study, Forbes et al. demonstrated 
threat-related interference with silhouettes that were not included in the target set. 
However, Forbes et al. used a design that does not allow for the separation of capture and 
disengagement. Moreover, they employed a visual search task with an extended display 
time in which inhibition of threat-related interference was not necessary to make a 
successful target response. In the current study, the four silhouettes were presented only 
briefly and thus competition for attentional resources was likely more intense. In order to 
carry out the task at hand successfully the target silhouette would have to receive 
sufficient attentional resources, leaving limited attentional resources for the other 
silhouettes. This would make it more difficult for a threat distracter to bias attention. One 
way in which the attentional system could ensure sufficient resources are allocated to the 
target stimulus is by adopting a strict top-down set and increasing the amount of top-down 
control on attentional allocation (Folk et al., 1992). Mermillod et al. (2010) showed that low-
spatial-frequency information is sufficient for fast recognition of threat stimuli and that it 
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may be particularly this information that provides rapid feed-forward input to the amygdala 
(Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009; Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2003). 
Nevertheless it is important for future studies to investigate whether top-down modulation 
is affected by the intensity of a threat stimulus and whether capture can be observed with 
more potent threat stimuli in the current cueing paradigm.  
Delayed disengagement was found to depend on the relationship of the threat 
stimulus to the behavioral goals. This commitment of attention is a function of two factors: 
(1) the activity generated by a stimulus once it has been attended, which should be higher 
when the stimulus matches an active goal compared to when it is irrelevant to current 
goals; (2) The perceptual properties of other stimuli that may compete for attention (see 
e.g. Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000). In the current study, a non-attended green stimulus 
should provide stronger competition for attentional resources than a non-attended white 
stimulus, since the green color signals that this stimulus is relevant to the current goal of 
target identification. Similar factors influence the allocation of visual spatial attention in 
other paradigms and they have received extensive attention in visual search (see e.g. Lipp 
& Waters, 2007). It is important to note that in our experiments when the cue drew 
attention to the location of a task-irrelevant threat stimulus (e.g., spider foil) the target 
frame contained a task-relevant feature singleton (e.g., green) to which attention was set 
to respond. In our case, then, the time to disengage represented a trade-off between the 
activation created by the foil stimulus and the ability of the target color to activate a 
preexisting attentional control setting. Here the silhouettes have no disadvantage in 
comparison to the more realistic stimuli because attention has already been directed to 
them by the cue. The current study is not able to disentangle the different stimulus-related 
forces that contribute to the observed interference by the threat stimulus. Threat value of a 
stimulus seems to be a main force, but previous research has also pointed to an important 
role for arousal and biological significance irrespective of valence (Brosch, Sander, & 
Scherer, 2007; Mourão-Miranda et al., 2003; Schimmack, 2005). Additionally it is fair to 
assume that low-level stimulus characteristics like contrast and angles play a role in what 
we term threat interference too (Mermillod et al., 2010; Yiend, 2010; Wolfe et al., 2003). 
The current study shows that the observed threat interference is an attentional effect and 
not a motor effect (as proposed by e.g. Mogg et al., 2008) as threat interference is absent 
on trials where attention is already on the spider or cat target. 
In summary, the current study is the first to assess threat interference in a 
procedure that controls the locus of attention at target onset, hence permitting the 
distinction between preferential attentional capture and delayed disengagement, while at 
  33 
the same time varying the specific top-down attentional set (by including the threat 
stimulus in the target set or not). The study found evidence for slowed disengagement 
from a threat distractor only if the threat distractor was part of the top-down attentional set. 
This finding suggests that task goals modulate the ability of a threat stimulus to hold 
attention and that the systems that mediate emotional responses are not necessarily 
isolated from those that mediate cognitive processes.  
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Footnotes 
1 We obtained similar results in subsequent studies with more detailed threat 
stimuli. Detailed statistical results are available from the first author. Slowed attentional 
disengagement from the cued spider distracter was not correlated with SPQ score (r(20) = 
.227, p = .336) or spider pictures’ fear and arousal ratings (fear: r(20) = .05, p = .836; 
arousal: r(20) = .156, p = .512). 
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Abstract 
The rapid orienting of attention to potential threats has been proposed to proceed outside 
of top-down control. However, paradigms that have been used to investigate this have 
struggled to separate the rapid orienting of attention (i.e. capture) from the later 
disengagement of focal attention that may be subject to top-down control. Consequently, it 
remains unclear whether and to what extent orienting to threat is contingent on top-down 
goals. The current study manipulated the goal-relevance of threat distractors (spiders), 
whilst a strict top-down attentional set was encouraged by presenting the saliently colored 
target and the threat distracter simultaneously for a limited time. The goal-relevance of 
threatening distractors was manipulated by including a spider amongst the possible target 
stimuli (Experiment 1: spider/cat targets) or excluding it (Experiment 2: bird/fish targets). 
Orienting and disengagement were disentangled by cueing attention away from or towards 
the threat prior to its onset. The results indicated that the threatening spider distractors 
elicited rapid orienting of attention when spiders were potentially goal-relevant (Experiment 
1), but did so much less when they were irrelevant to the task goal (Experiment 2). 
Delayed disengagement from the threat distractors was even more strongly contingent on 
the task goal and occurred only when a spider was a possible target. These results 
highlight the role of top-down goals in attentional orienting to and disengagement from 
threat. 
Keywords: capture, disengagement, threat, top-down goals, response time 
distribution 
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Threat Captures Attention, But Not Automatically: Top-Down Goals Modulate 
Attentional Orienting To Threat Distractors. 
An organism’s odds of survival can be increased by focusing the limited-capacity 
processing resources of the visual system on potential threats in the environment (Öhman 
& Mineka, 2001; Tamietto & De Gelder, 2010; West, Anderson, & Pratt, 2009). For 
example, if a visual scene contained both a potentially poisonous spider and a harmless 
butterfly, orienting attention to the spider would facilitate its processing, and allow us to 
take appropriate actions. According to evolutionary models of threat processing, such 
prioritized processing of potential threats is largely stimulus-driven and reliant on a fast, 
subcortical pathway that is unaffected by cognitive influences such as current task goals or 
intentions (LeDoux, 1996; Öhman & Mineka, 2001).  
One potential issue is that such an encapsulated threat system could conflict with 
the allocation of attention in accordance with an organism’s immediate top-down goals and 
may even endanger survival (Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011; Mathews & 
Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Yiend, 2010). For example, while you are 
driving, reflexively orienting to a spider on your leg and the goal-contingent orienting of 
attention to a traffic light that turns red at exactly the same time, would be at odds with 
each other. Under conditions of stimulus competition (i.e. when multiple stimuli vie for 
attention), current theories of attention propose that orienting is the convergent result of 
goal-driven (i.e. top-down) and stimulus-driven (i.e. bottom-up) processes (Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995; Wolfe, 1994). For example, according to the Guided Search model, salient 
stimuli can guide orienting, but be further up- or down-modulated depending on their 
relevance to current top-down goals (Wolfe, 1994). Given that the allocation of attention is 
strongly determined by top-down goals (see e.g. Ansorge, Kiss, & Worschech, 2010; Awh, 
Matsukura, & Serences, 2003; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Serences et al., 2005; 
Wolfe, Butcher, Lee, & Hyle, 2003), this raises the question of whether top-down task-
goals can also affect orienting to threat. 
To date, it is not clear whether prioritized orienting to threat is purely automatic, as 
claimed by the evolutionary account, or whether it is susceptible to cognitive processes, as 
would be more in line with current theories of visual search (even though such theories do 
not explicitly model attention to threat). Previous studies may seem to suggest that threat 
stimuli are prioritized for attention (over neutral stimuli) regardless of their relevance to the 
current task goal (Lipp & Waters, 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). For example, goal-
relevant threat targets (snakes) are detected more rapidly than neutral targets (frogs and 
flowers) in visual search tasks (LoBue & DeLoache, 2008, 2011), but goal-irrelevant threat 
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distractors (snake, spider) also slow target responses relative to neutral distractors (e.g.: 
butterflies and leaves, Devue, Belopolsky and Theeuwes, 2011; lizards and cockroaches, 
Lipp & Waters, 2007). Furthermore, studies using the dot-probe task have demonstrated 
that goal-irrelevant threat distractors that preceded a neutral target (irrelevant cue), speed 
responses when the threat distractor and target are presented in the same location and 
slow responding when presented in a different location (Koster, Crombez, & Verschuere, & 
De Houwer, 2004). Together such results have been taken to indicate that threat 
distractors can compel attention irrespective of the current task goals (i.e. when they are 
goal-relevant and goal-irrelevant).  
An issue in previous studies is that they often struggle to distinguish early 
attentional orienting (i.e. capture) and later processes that commence after the selection of 
a stimulus (i.e. disengagement of focal attention; Yiend, 2010). Very few studies have 
been able to provide evidence in support of rapid orienting to threat (see e.g. Stein, 
Seymour, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2014; West, Anderson, & Pratt, 2009). Delays in attentional 
disengagement have been observed more readily, mainly in studies employing the dot-
probe paradigm with a neutral baseline (e.g. Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002). For example, 
Koster and colleagues (2004) showed that the time to locate a neutral target (dot) was 
longer when the target followed in the opposite location from a threat distractor (high threat 
IAPS picture) than when it appeared on a trial with neutral distractors (non-threat IAPS 
pictures). One issue with this approach is that attention is at fixation at the beginning of 
each trial and thus the threat will need to attract attention before it can influence 
disengagement. Belopolsky, Devue, and Theeuwes (2011) eliminated such a confound by 
presenting the (threat)-distractors at fixation and requiring an eye-movement to be made 
away from fixation to a target in the periphery. As it is unclear to what extend people 
engage with a stimulus at fixation, Rudaizky, Basanovic, and MacLeod (2014) have 
furthered this issue by using an exogenous cue to direct attention towards or away from 
the threat distractor and observed evidence for both rapid orienting towards and delayed 
disengagement from threats.  
Disentangling orienting and disengagement is important because both processes 
may differ in their susceptibility to goal-driven modulation (see e.g. Carrasco, 2011). For 
instance, according to LeDoux’ (1996) account, it is plausible that only the initial rapid 
orienting response would be determined by subcortical processes that are encapsulated 
from cognitive top-down control (Low Road; also see Luo et al., 2010). By contrast, 
maintaining or disengaging attention commences at a later stage and could be influenced 
by top-down goals because potential threats are eventually also cognitively evaluated in 
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the cortex (High Road; see also Carrasco, 2011, for a similar view). To assess this, a 
paradigm is needed that can both manipulate the locus of attention prior to the threat 
presentation and the goal relevance of a threat (see Vromen, Lipp & Remington, 2015, for 
a similar critique). To study rapid attentional orienting to threat it is imperative to ensure 
that when the threat distractor appears, attention is allocated elsewhere and that the target 
is not in the distractor location (i.e. the threat will need to capture attention to interfere with 
target responding). In turn, to obtain a clear measurement of attentional disengagement it 
is imperative that attention is already at the threat location (thus eliminating the need for 
attentional orienting), such that the time needed to disengage attention from the threat 
stimulus can be compared to disengagement from other, neutral stimuli.  
In a previous study, Vromen, Lipp, and Remington (2015) used a modified spatial 
cueing paradigm to exert tight control over attention and disentangle orienting and 
disengagement (Posner, 1980). The observer’s task was to search for a green animal 
silhouette among 3 grey irrelevant animal silhouettes (distractors). Prior to target 
presentation, attention was controlled by a green pre-cue. Previous studies have shown 
that such a target-matching cue will reliably attract attention even when it is non-predictive 
of the target (e.g., Folk & Remington, 1998). The results confirmed that the green cue 
successfully controlled attention, as reflected in significantly faster responses on target-
cued versus distractor-cued trials. Orienting was assessed on trials where the spider was 
presented at a non-cued location, whereas disengagement was assessed on trials where 
the spider distractor was cued.  
Vromen and colleagues (2015) showed that the goal-irrelevant spider silhouette 
only led to significant disengagement costs when spiders were among the possible target 
stimuli (i.e., potentially goal-relevant), not when the spider was completely task-irrelevant. 
Attention was not oriented to the spider silhouette, regardless of its relevance to the task-
goal. These findings contrast with previous studies that showed large costs by task-
irrelevant spider stimuli (Lipp & Waters, 2007; Öhman et al., 2012; Ouimet et al., 2012; 
Rinck et al., 2005). Such a discrepancy could be due to the fact that the modified spatial 
cueing paradigm encourages the implementation of a strict top-down target set due to the 
salient target color and brief, simultaneous presentation of target and distractor. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the spider stimulus failed to attract attention because the 
silhouette shapes were not realistic enough to elicit fear or trigger a threat response. For 
instance, Mather and Sutherland (2011) proposed that the effects of high priority stimuli 
(e.g. threat) on attention are amplified by arousal. Similarly, Phelps and LeDoux (2005) 
have proposed that arousal is the key factor that determines the speed of processing 
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different stimuli as well as how strongly they are represented (see also Lang & Bradley, 
2010).  
The aim of the present study was to test whether attention would be oriented to 
more naturalistic threat distractors within the rigorous conditions of the modified spatial 
cueing paradigm. Moreover, to examine to what extent the early covert orienting of 
attention to threat would be modulated by top-down processes, we assessed the effects of 
photorealistic spider distractors on attention when the spider was among the possible 
targets (Experiments 1) versus when it was a completely task-irrelevant distractor 
(Experiment 2). Thus, the current study assessed orienting to and disengagement from 
identical spider distractors with their relevance to the task-goal being manipulated across 
experiments. 
Experiment 1 
The aim of the first experiment was to investigate whether prioritized orienting to 
and delayed disengagement from threatening photorealistic spider distractors (as 
compared to non-threatening cat distractors) was evident when both were goal-relevant 
(i.e. part of the target-set). The observer’s task was to identify the green target singleton as 
a spider or cat, while ignoring the three grey-scale distractors (a bird, a fish, and a spider 
or cat). On half of the trials a grey-scale spider was present amongst the distractors, while 
on the other half of the trials a grey-scale cat distractor was present (see Figure 1 for an 
example of the stimulus displays). To assess whether the spider pictures were indeed 
perceived as more threatening than the other animal pictures, the photorealistic animal 
pictures were rated in terms of their fearfulness and arousal. Moreover, to ensure 
generalizability of the results, the participant population was assessed in terms of their 
spider fear with the Spider Phobia Questionnaire (SPQ; Klorman, Hastings, Weerts, 
Melamed, & Lang, 1974). 
Prior to presenting the target display, attention was cued to one of the four potential 
stimulus locations by a target-colored cue (four green dots), so that the spider or cat 
distractor was initially attended on some trials (disengagement trials) and unattended on 
others (orienting trials; see Figure 1). The effectiveness of the green cue in controlling 
attention was confirmed by faster target identification on trials on which the cue had been 
presented at the target location compared to trials where the cue had been presented 
elsewhere (see Figure 3). Pre-cueing of a threatening spider or a non-threatening cat 
distractor allowed measuring disengagement, as attention did not have to be oriented to 
the stimulus anymore, only to be disengaged and re-oriented to the target. Pre-cueing a 
different stimulus (e.g., neutral distractor or target) allowed measuring whether attention 
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would be oriented to the threatening spider and non-threatening cat distractor, as they 
would need to capture attention in order to interfere with target identification. Based on the 
previous study by Vromen et al. (2015), threatening spider distractors would be expected 
to hold attention over and above non-threatening cat distractors. Due to the increased 
threat or arousal value of the photorealistic spider stimuli we also hypothesized that 
attention would be oriented more readily to threatening spider distracters than non-
threatening cat distractors. 
 
 
Figure 1. The procedure for the spatial cueing task (diagonally from bottom left to top right) 
showing an example of a foil-cued trial with a spider distractor from Experiment 1. The two 
cueing displays at the top left exemplify a target- and distractor-cued trial respectively. The 
foil-cued trials allowed examining delayed disengagement from the spider distractor (RT 
cued spider distractor – RT cued cat distractor), whereas target- and distractor-cued trials 
allowed examining orienting to the spider distractor (RT non-cued spider distractor – RT 
non-cued cat distractor). 
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Method 
Participants.  
Twenty-four students from the University of Queensland, Australia (14 women; M = 
19.29 years, SD = 3.42 years) participated in the experiment for course credit. One subject 
was excluded because of a 100% error rate in one condition.  
Participants’ total SPQ score ranged from 1 to 23, with a mean of 9.27 (SD = 6.63). 
This is indicative of a wide range of non-clinical spider fear, with non-fearful samples’ total 
SPQ score usually being centered around 4 and arachnophobic samples’ around 23 
(Fredrickson, 1983; Muris & Merckelbach, 1996). 
Apparatus.  
Stimulus presentation was controlled by DMDX (Forster & Forster, 2003) running on 
a Dell Optiplex 780 computer. Stimuli were presented on with a 19-in. color monitor with a 
resolution of 1,024 x 768 pixels, and a refresh rate of 85Hz. Responses were collected 
through the left and right shift keys on a QWERTY keyboard.  
Materials. 
Spatial Cueing Task. The fixation display consisted of a central fixation cross and 
four placeholder boxes (see Figure 1). Placeholders (2.9°x2.5°) were positioned in a 
cross-like configuration equidistantly from the central fixation cross (5.7° from the nearest 
corner). The cueing display consisted of the fixation display with the addition of a spatial 
cue that consisted of a set of four green squares (CIE luv values = 80, -71, 92), each 
measuring (0.5°x0.5°). The target display consisted of the fixation display with the addition 
of four animal pictures presented within each of the 4 placeholders. All target displays 
contained a spider, cat, bird, and fish, whereby either the spider or cat were presented in 
green (target), and the bird and fish were always presented in grey (non-targets). 
In total 24 photorealistic animal pictures were used, consisting of 6 spider, cat, bird, 
and fish pictures each. They were drawn from previous experiments conducted in the 
Emotion, Learning, and Psychophysiology Laboratory at The University of Queensland, 
from the Internet, and from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005). The original picture backgrounds were replaced by a uniform 
white background and the animals were equated in size (Mpixels = 2011) and average grey 
value (MCIEluv values = 54,0,0). The 12 animal target pictures used in Experiment 1 were 
created by transforming the color balance of each spider and cat picture so that bright 
green-scale images were created (MCIEluv values = 80, -71, 92). A pilot-test with  20 
participants was conducted to confirm that spider and cat targets do not differ in time to be 
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identified in a set-up where they were presented among three neutral animals, bird, fish, 
and horse non-targets, and in the absence of a cat or spider distractor ). The results of a 
paired t-test comparing trials with the spider versus cat target revealed no significant 
difference in target identification time (t(20) = 1.411, p = .174). 
Rating Task. To assess whether spider pictures were indeed more threatening 
than cat, bird and fish pictures, respectively, animal fear ratings for were collected for all 
stimuli using a visual analogue scale (VAS; 170mm long) labelled with “Not at all fearful” 
on the left-hand side to “Very fearful” on the right-hand side, with no intermediate labels. 
Picture fear and arousal ratings for each animal category were also collected, with the 
VAS ranging from “Not at all scary” to “Very scary” for the former and from “Not at all 
arousing” to “Very arousing” for the latter.   
As shown in Figure 2, spider pictures had higher fear-ratings (M  = 94.02, SD = 
46.45) than cats, birds, and fish pictures (cats: M = 27.68, SD = 36.76, t(21) = 7.343, p < 
.001; birds:  M = 42.00, SD = 42.39, t(21) = 4.058, p = .001; fish: M = 28.64, SD = 36.68, 
t(21) = 7.178, p < .001), whereas the others did not differ in terms of their fear ratings 
(cats-birds: t(21) = 1.436, p = .166; cats-fish: t(21) = .125, p = .902; birds-fish: t(21) = 
1.259, p < .222). The results showed that spider and cat pictures had higher arousal-
ratings (spider: M = 55.64, SD = 46.05; cat: M = 44.05, SD = 44.05) than bird and fish 
pictures (birds: M = 26.57, SD = 27.04; fish: M = 28.07, SD = 29.97; spider vs. bird: t(21) = 
2.909, p = .008; spider vs. fish: t(21) = 2.895, p = .009; cat vs. bird: t(21) = 2.370, p = .027; 
cat vs. fish: t(21) = 2.124, p = .046). Arousal ratings for spider and cat pictures did not 
differ from one another (t(21) = 1.104, p = .282) nor did arousal ratings for bird and fish 
pictures (t(21) < 1). 
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Figure 2. Mean fear and arousal ratings (and standard errors of the means) for the spider, 
cat, bird, and fish pictures in Experiment 1 (panel A) and Experiment 2 (panel B). In both 
experiments, spiders were rated as scarier than cats, birds, and fish. In Experiment 1, 
spiders and cats were rated as equally arousing and as more arousing than birds and fish. 
In Experiment 2 fish were rated as less arousing than cats, while no other differences in 
arousal were observed. ** = p < .001, * = p < .05. 
 
Design.  
The experiment consisted of the 3 × 2 within subjects conditions Cued Picture 
[target-, distractor-, foil-cued] and Distractor Identity [spider, cat]. Contingent on which 
picture was displayed in the cued placeholder, three trial types can be distinguished: 
target-cued trials (25%; 72 trials) where the green cue was presented at the location of the 
green target picture (spider or cat); distractor-cued trials (50%; 144 trials), in which the cue 
was presented at the location of a grey-scale picture with a non-target identity (bird or 
fish); and foil-cued trials (25%; 72 trials), where the cue was presented at the location of 
the grey distractor with a target identity (spider or cat). On half of the foil trials the 
distractor was a spider, and on the other half a cat.  
Each picture was displayed equally often and each animal category was displayed 
equally often in each of the four placeholders. Each participant completed 12 practice trials 
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and 288 test trials. Trial presentation order was randomized for each participant and 
allocation of target animal to response key was counterbalanced across participants. 
Procedure.  
All participants first completed a spatial cueing task that consisted of a practice 
phase and a test phase. Immediately afterwards they completed the pen-and-paper 
version of the SPQ (Klorman et al., 1974) as well as the animal and picture VASs.  
Spatial cueing task. At the start of the spatial cueing task participants were 
informed that each target display would contain four animal pictures (a spider, cat, bird, 
and fish). They were instructed to identify, as quickly and accurately as possible, whether 
the single green picture on each trial depicted a spider or a cat by pressing the left or right 
shift keys. Participants were told to try to ignore all grey-scale pictures and the green cue 
presented prior to the target display, as these stimuli were all irrelevant to their task.  
Each trial started with the presentation of the fixation display (882 ms) which was 
followed immediately by the cue display (82 ms; see Figure 1). After the cue display, the 
fixation display was presented again (82 ms), followed by the target display (47 ms). The 
target display was followed by a white screen (882 ms). The next trial then started again 
with the presentation of the fixation display. Accuracy feedback was only presented on 
practice trials. 
Results 
Data. 
 Reaction times from incorrect responses and extreme scores, defined as values 
more than three standard deviations above or below each participant’s mean reaction 
time, were excluded from the analyses leading to a loss of 10% of all data. 
Green Cue.  
First, to assess whether the color cue directed attention, mean RT on target- and 
non-target- (distractor- and foil-) cued trials were assessed. The one-way ANOVA showed 
a significant effect of Cued Picture [target, distractor, foil] on target identification time, 
F(2,22) = 70.499, p < .001, partial η2 = .865 (see Figure 3). Follow-up paired t-tests 
showed faster target identification on target-cued trials than on distractor-cued trials (by 83 
ms, t(23) = 11.613, p < .001) and foil-cued trials (by 96 ms, t(23) = 10.897, p < .001), and 
slower target identification on foil-cued trials compared to distractor-cued trials (by 13 ms, 
t(23) = 2.221, p = .037). 
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Figure 3. Mean target identification time (and standard error from the means) on target-, 
distractor-, and foil-cued trials in Experiment 1 (averaged over spider and cat distractor 
trials). Target identification is faster on target-cued trials than on distractor- and foil-cued 
trials. ** = p < .001, * = p < .05. 
 
Orienting.  
To assess attentional orienting to spider distractors, we employed two paired t-tests 
to compare target identification time on trials with a non-cued spider versus cat distractor. 
The first paired t-test showed that on distractor-cued trials, the spider slowed target 
identification by 52 ms more than the cat distractor, t(23) = 4.691, p < .001 (see Figure 4, 
panel A). The second paired t-test showed that even on target-cued trials where attention 
was already allocated to the target, the spider distractor slowed target identification, by 47 
ms, compared with the cat-distractor, t(23) = 3.559, p < .05. Error rates did not differ 
between trials with a spider or cat distractor, neither on distractor-cued trials, t(23) = .277, 
p = .784, not on target-cued trials, t(23) = 1.045, p = .307). 
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Figure 4. Panel A. Mean target identification time (and standard errors of the means) on 
distractor- and target-cued trials with a spider versus cat distractor in Experiment 1. Panel 
B. Mean target identification time (and standard errors of the means) on foil-cued trials 
with a spider versus cat distractor in Experiment 1. ** = p < .001, * = p < .05. 
 
 Disengagement.  
To assess whether spider distractors delayed disengagement, we used a paired t-
test to compare target identification time on trials with a cued spider versus a cued cat 
distractor. Cueing the spider distractor slowed target identification on average by 72 ms 
compared to cueing of the cat distractor, t(23) = 5.253, p < .001 (see Figure 4, panel B). 
The mean errors showed the same results, with significantly more errors when the spider 
distractor had been cued (M = 21.64, SD = 18.24) compared to when the cat distractor 
had been cued (M = 15.39, SD = 19.40; t(23) = 3.250, p = .004). We also conducted a t-
test to compare target identification time on trials were the spider distractor was cued (foil 
trials; 728 ms) or non-cued (distractor trials; 702 ms). Cueing the spider distractor slowed 
target identification by 26 ms compared to presenting the spider distractor in a non-cued 
location, t(23) = 3.086, p = .005. The same t-test for cat distractor trials (650 ms versus 
656 ms) showed no such difference, t(23) = 1.013, p = .321. 
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Discussion 
The current experiment shows rapid orienting to photorealistic spider distractors in 
the modified cueing paradigm with a spider and cat target set. Rapid orienting to the threat 
distractor was observed even when attention was already at the target location and thus 
there was no need to shift attention. The experiment also shows evidence for delayed 
disengagement from the goal-relevant spider distractors when they were presented in a 
cued location. The current findings contrast with a previous study by Vromen and 
colleagues (2015), which showed that simplistic threat silhouettes delayed disengagement 
when they were goal-relevant, but did not capture attention, and suggests that the pre-
attentive orienting to and the subsequent disengagement of attention from the same threat 
may be differentially susceptible to stimulus characteristics. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 showed that spider distractors can both capture attention and delay 
disengagement when the current target-set includes spiders. To assess whether the rapid 
orienting of attention to spider distractors is contingent on top-down attentional control, 
Experiment 2 assessed orienting to the same spiders when they were not relevant to the 
top-down target-set (bird and fish targets). Previous studies have shown that spider 
distractors can bias attention even when they are completely irrelevant to the current task-
goal, which has been interpreted as evidence for the evolutionary hypothesis that 
attentional orienting is not subject to top-down modulation. If this hypothesis holds in the 
present design, which 1) allows distinguishing between attentional orienting and 
disengagement and 2) encourages the adoption of a strict top-down set, then Experiment 
2 should yield the same results as Experiment 1. However, a previous study has provided 
evidence that disengagement from threat can be affected by top-down modulation 
(Vromen, Lipp, & Remington, 2015). If orienting to threat is also contingent on top-down 
control, then we would expect Experiment 2 to show evidence for reduced attentional 
orienting to spider distractors. As in Experiment 1, if attention is oriented preferentially to 
spider distractors then non-cued spider distractors should interfere with target responses, 
while delayed disengagement should manifest in prolonged RTs with spider distractors are 
cued. 
Method 
Participants.  
Twenty-five students from the University of Queensland, Australia (13 women; M = 
18.17 years, SD = 3.84) participated in the experiment for course credit. Participants total 
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SPQ score ranged from 0 to 21, with a mean of 8.36 (SD = 5.09; Klorman et al., 1974). 
The SPQ scores in Experiment 2 did not differ from those in Experiment 1, as assessed by 
an independent-samples t-test: t(45) = .533, p = .597. 
Apparatus.  
The apparatus was identical to Experiment 1. 
Materials.  
The materials were identical to Experiment 1, with the following exceptions.  
Spatial Cueing Task. The targets in Experiment 2 were either a green fish or a 
green bird (identical to the grey-scale bird and fish pictures except in color; never a spider 
or cat). Each target display consisted of a green bird or fish (target), grey bird or fish (foil), 
spider or cat, and a horse (distractors). Six horse pictures were added to the overall 
stimulus set. 
Rating Task. Similar to experiment 1, spider pictures had higher fear ratings (M = 
88.13, SD = 55.35) than cat, bird, and fish pictures (cats: M = 16.00, SD = 20.52, t(23) = 
6.116, p < .001; birds: M = 19.13, SD = 24.88, t(23) = 6.284, p < .001; fish: M = 20.79, SD 
= 35.79, t(23) = 6.676, p < .001; see Figure 2, right panel). Arousal ratings were 
comparable for all pictures (spiders: M = 48.12, SD = 48.81; fish: M = 27.00, SD = 35.21; 
all ts < 1.4), except for cats (M = 43.88, SD = 47.90) being rated as more arousing than 
fish (M = 27.00, SD = 35.21; t(21) = 2.118, p = .045). 
Design.  
The design was identical to experiment 1, with 4 stimuli displayed on each trial. The 
following changes were implemented. On each trial a bird, fish (one as the target, one as a 
target-similar distractor), either spider or cat (as target-dissimilar distractors), and a horse 
distractor were presented. To compare cat and spider distractor trials when both were 
irrelevant to the task, the targets in Experiment 2 were a green bird or a green fish (never 
a cat or spider). When the target was a bird, the fish was included in the display as the foil, 
and when the target was a fish, the bird acted as the foil. Moreover, each display 
contained a single irrelevant spider or cat distractor. As we wanted to keep the number of 
stimuli within a display identical to Experiment 1 (4 items), we added a neutral horse 
distractor to each display. Thus, each display contained a green target (bird/fish), foil 
distractor (fish/bird), irrelevant threatening or non-threatening distractor (spider/cat), and a 
neutral distractor (horse). With this, the conditions and displays in Experiment 2 were 
maximally similar to those used in Experiment 1, with all changes relating to the necessity 
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of presenting the spider and cat distractors in separate displays (as these were the critical 
comparison categories). Attentional orienting and disengagement were measured by 
comparing trials with a spider vs. cat distractor when they were not pre-cued and cued (by 
the green cue), respectively. Thus, four different trial types can be distinguished: (1) target-
cued trials (25%; 72 trials) where the green cue was presented at the location of the green 
target (green-scale bird or fish); (2) spider/cat distractor-cued trials (25%; 72 trials) where 
the cue was presented at the location of the spider or cat distractor; (3) horse distractor-
cued trials (25%; 72 trials) where the cue was presented at the location of a grey-scale 
horse picture, and (4) foil-cued trials (25%; 72 trials) where the cue was presented at the 
location of a grey-scale target-similar distractor (bird or fish). 
Procedure.  
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1. The only difference was that 
participants were instructed to identify whether the single green picture on each trial 
depicted a bird or a fish (rather than a spider or cat as in Experiment 1). 
Results 
Green cue.  
Fifteen percent of all data was lost due to errors and extreme scores. The one-way 
ANOVA showed a significant effect of Cued Picture [target-, horse distractor-, spider/cat 
distractor-, and foil-cued] on target identification time, F(3,22) = 48.246, p < .01, partial η2 
= .868 (see Figure 5). Paired t-tests showed that target identification was faster on target-
cued trials than on distractor-cued trials (spider/cat cued: 101 ms, t(24) = 12.192, p < .001; 
horse cued: 98 ms, t(24) = 12.123, p < .001) and foil-cued trials (103 ms, t(24) = 10.935, p 
< .001), indicating that the color cue directed attention. There was no difference between 
the other trial types (horse-cued trials vs. spider/cat-cued: 3 ms, t(24) = .905, p = .374; 
spider/cat-cued vs. foil-cued: 2 ms, t(24) = .347, p = .732; horse-cued vs. foil-cued: 5 ms, 
t(24) = .839, p = .410). 
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Figure 5. Mean target identification time (and standard error of the means) for 
target-, horse distractor-, spider/cat distractor-, and foil-cued trials in Experiment 2 
(averaged over spider and cat distractor trials). Target identification is faster on target-
cued trials than on both the distractor-cued trials and the foil-cued trials. ** = p < .001. 
 
Orienting. 
To assess whether the spider distractors captured attention, we conducted three 
paired t-tests to compare spider and cat distractor trials when the cue had been presented 
in a location other than that of the spider or cat (see Figure 6, panel A). When the cue had 
been presented at the location of the horse (horse cued trial), target identification was 18 
ms slower with a spider distractor than with a cat distractor (t(24) = 2.227, p = .036). When 
the cue had been presented at the location of the foil (fish or bird), there were no 
differences between spider and cat distractor trials, t <1. Similarly, on target-cued trials, 
when the cue directed attention directly to the green target, there were no differences 
between spider and cat distractor trials, t(24) = .714, p = .482). The results for the mean 
error rates were in the same direction, with more errors on spider than cat distractor trials 
only observed on horse-cued trials, t(24) = 3.079, p = .005), and no differences on foil-
cued trials, t(24) = 1.270, p = .994, or target-cued trials, t(24) = .175, p = .863. 
  60 
 
Figure 6. Panel A. Mean target identification time (and standard errors of the 
means) on horse distractor-, foil-, and target-cued trials with a spider versus cat distractor 
in Experiment 2. Panel B. Mean target identification time (and standard errors of the 
means) on spider/cat distractor-cued trials in Experiment 2. ** = p < .001, * = p < .05.  
 
Disengagement.  
To assess delayed disengagement, a paired t-test compared target identification 
time on spider-cued trials with cat-cued trials. The results showed no difference between 
the two (t(24) = .971, p = .341; see Figure 6, panel B). Similarly, the mean error rates 
showed no difference between spider and cat-cued trials (t(24) = .984, p = .335).  
Orienting and disengagement compared across experiments.  
 A direct comparison of the overall spider orienting scores (RT non-cued spider 
distractor trials minus RT non-cued cat distractor trials) between Experiments 1 (M = 49 
ms) and 2 (M = 4 ms) with an independent samples t-test confirmed that orienting to 
spiders was significantly reduced in Experiment 2, t(46) = 3.731, p = .001. A direct 
comparison of the overall spider disengagement scores (RT cued spider distractor trials 
minus RT cued cat distractor trials) between Experiments 1 (M = 73 ms) and 2 (M = 12 
ms) with an independent samples t-test confirmed that spider disengagement was also 
significantly reduced in Experiment 2, t(46) = 3.308, p = .002. 
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Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 showed that orienting to spider distractors was much 
reduced when spiders were not included in the target-set. The spider distractor only 
attracted attention when attention had initially been misdirected to an entirely task-
irrelevant stimulus, but not when the target or target-similar distractor (foil) had been cued. 
Thus even when the spider was task-irrelevant it still had the ability to capture attention, 
but only when the initially attended (cued) stimulus did not contain any task-relevant 
features (non-target identity and color). These findings indicate that threatening spider 
stimuli did only capture attention away from task-relevant stimuli (foil, target; Experiment 1) 
when included in the target set (i.e., potentially task-relevant), which provides strong 
evidence for the view that attentional orienting to threatening stimuli is modulated by goal-
driven processes. A second important finding of the current study was that delayed 
disengagement from the threat was eliminated when spiders were not included in the 
target-set. Of note, deviating from previous studies, capture by the spider was not 
necessary to observe delayed disengagement, as attention was directed to the spider by 
the green cue.  
General Discussion 
The present study provides evidence that top-down processes modulate both 
attentional orienting and attentional disengagement when these processes are 
manipulated and measured independently from each other. The study also demonstrates 
that a task-relevant spider distractor can attract attention even when the locus of attention 
is tightly controlled. This contrasts with the findings of Vromen et al. (2015) where a 
potentially task-relevant spider silhouette did not attract attention. Consequently, rapid 
orienting to threat may require a richness in stimulus features that is observed only in more 
naturalistic stimuli. More naturalistic images are likely also evaluated as being more 
threatening or arousing. Support for perceived threat value, rather than arousal value, was 
observed in the current study as spider images were rated as more threatening, but not 
more arousing, than control stimuli (see Figure 2; see e.g. Mather & Sutherland, 2011; 
Phelps & LeDoux, 2005; though a strong test of the arousal hypothesis may require a 
psychophysiological measurement of arousal).  
Still, it should be noted that the present study cannot rule out that the effects of the 
threatening spider were due to its salient perceptual features (e.g. its long legs). Previous 
studies have shown that attention can be automatically attracted to salient features that 
are embedded in complex stimuli (such as visible teeth in angry faces; e.g. Becker, 
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Horstmann, & Remington, 2011; Horstmann & Becker, 2008; Horstmann, Lipp, & Becker, 
2012). However, these findings do not necessarily contradict the evolutionary view, as 
certain feature detectors (e.g., for the detection of spiders) could have evolved because 
they were relevant for survival, thus rendering the visual system more sensitive to these 
features (e.g., Horstmann & Bauland, 2006). Moreover, the conclusion that the implied 
threat value plays a role in driving attention seems to be the most parsimonious 
explanation for the differences observed between spider silhouettes vs. more naturalistic 
spider stimuli (Vromen et al., 2015); specifically, the finding that only the more naturalistic 
spider attracted attention when they were completely task-irrelevant. See footnote 1 for an 
exploratory comparison of the experiments reported in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. 
Of most interest to our research question, we observed that orienting to spider 
distractors was modulated by top-down goals such that orienting was strong when a spider 
was amongst the possible targets (i.e. potentially goal-relevant; Experiment 1), but much 
reduced when it was completely goal-irrelevant (Experiment 2). Specifically, when the 
spider was potentially goal-relevant, it attracted attention even when attention was pre-
cued to the target and obviated the need for further search. By contrast, when the spider 
was goal-irrelevant and attention was cued to a target or foil, the spider distractor failed to 
attract attention. Only when attention had been pre-cued to another task-irrelevant and 
target-dissimilar distractor did the photorealistic spider attract attention. The results show 
that spider distractors have an ability to attract attention even when they are completely 
task-irrelevant.  
This finding is in line with previous studies that have demonstrated evidence for 
rapid orienting to (simplistic) task-irrelevant threat (see e.g. Carlson & Reinke, 2008). 
However, previous studies differ from the present study in that (1) the target was often not 
singled out by a salient perceptual feature (e.g., green colour) that would allow effective 
top-down tuning of attention to the target; (2) the target was often presented until the 
response, which contrasts with the data-limited displays used in the present study, and in 
that (3) the locus of attention was not as tightly controlled as in the present study (Lipp & 
Waters, 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Öhman & Mineka, 2001; Rinck et al., 2005; 
Schmidt, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012; Schmidt, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2014). The 
modified cueing paradigm as employed in the current study may be less likely than 
previously employed paradigms to show orienting to goal-irrelevant threats due to the 
conditions encouraging a strong top-down bias to the target feature(s). Hence, the finding 
that task-irrelevant photorealistic spiders could still attract attention shows that threatening 
stimuli can attract attention quite strongly – viz., against an effective top-down set for 
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completely different stimuli (i.e., green bird and fish targets) and despite the fact that data-
limited displays require allocating attention swiftly to the target. That said, the theoretically 
more important finding is perhaps that orienting to threat was still modulated by top-down 
control (see comparison between Experiment 1 and 2). This shows that orienting to threat 
is not encapsulated from top-down control (LeDoux, 1996; Öhman & Mineka, 2001), but 
instead requires a model that takes both the (subjective) threat value of stimuli and their 
task relevance into account, and allows top-down modulation of threatening stimuli (e.g., 
competitive interaction model; e.g., Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; see also e.g. Desimone 
& Duncan, 1995; Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010). 
The current results also demonstrate top-down modulation of attentional 
disengagement, with a spider distractor delaying disengagement only when it was 
potentially goal-relevant (Experiment 1). Both orienting and disengagement have to be due 
to distractor-related effects and cannot be due to target-related effects since a pilot study 
without spider and cat distractors showed that the identification speed was comparable for 
spider and cat targets. The observed top-down modulation of both orienting and 
disengagement may call into question a strict distinction between early and late attentional 
processes, as has, for instance, been proposed by Carrasco (2011). Instead it may 
indicate that both are largely determined by the same, cognitively penetrable mechanisms 
(see also Becker, 2011). However, this conclusion is certainly speculative and would 
require further research. 
Potential alternative accounts 
Our conclusion that the differences in orienting and disengagement between 
Experiments 1 and 2 were due to top-down influences could still be subject to two possible 
objections. First, it should be noted that if participants in Experiment 2 were generally less 
fearful of spiders, this could provide an alternative explanation for reduced attentional 
orienting to threat. Second, the mean target identification time in Experiment 2 (M = 718 
ms) was longer than in Experiment 1 (M = 663 ms). One might argue that slower target 
identification could be correlated with reduced spider interference, if the process that is 
needed to override attention to spider distractors is an active, effortful process that takes 
time to implement (e.g., filtering; see Folk & Remington, 1998). If this was the case, spider 
interference would be expected to be more pronounced on trials with relatively faster RTs 
and less pronounced on trials with slower RTs within each of the experiments.  
To assess whether attentional orienting was affected by spider fear, we first re-
analysed the data from Experiments 1 and 2 separately for the relatively more and less 
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spider fearful participants. Second, to probe whether prioritized attention to spider 
distractors and its top-down control differed over the response time distribution, we 
assessed orienting and disengagement separately for each decile of the RT distribution. 
Effects of self-reported spider fear.  
Orienting. To assess whether prioritized orienting to spider distractors was 
contingent on spider fear we carried out a median split analysis based on participants’ total 
SPQ scores (median SPQ score Experiment 1: 8; Experiment 2: 7). For Experiment 1, an 
independent samples t-test showed that the orienting difference scores (RT non-cued 
spider distractor minus RT non-cued cat distractor) did not differ between the relatively 
more and less spider fearful group, neither on distractor-cued trials, t(22) = .282, p = .695, 
nor target-cued trials, t(22) = 1.513, p = .145. The same comparisons for the overall error 
rates showed no difference either between the relatively more and less fearful groups 
(distractor-cued: t(22) = .295, p = .771; target-cued: t(22) = .851, p = .404). 
In a similar vein, no differences in orienting were observed between the relatively 
more and less spider fearful groups in Experiment 2. Target identification time was 
comparable for the relatively more and less fearful groups on horse distractor-cued trials: 
t(23) = .759, p = .456, and target-cued trials: t(23) = 1.225, p = .233). The overall 
difference between the relatively more and less fearful groups was significant (in the 
hypothesized direction) on foil-cued trials, t(23) = 2.691, p = .013, but follow-up t-tests 
showed that neither group showed a delay in target identification that differed significantly 
from zero (higher fear: t(12) = 1.795, p = .098; lower fear: t(11) = 2.027, p = .068). No 
differences in error rates were observed either between the groups (horse distractor-cued 
trials: t(23) = 1.728, p = .097; foil-cued trials: t(23) = .982, p = .336; target-cued trials: t(23) 
= 1.635, p = .116).  
Disengagement. To assess whether attentional disengagement was contingent on 
spider fear, we compared the disengagement score (RT cued spider distractor minus RT 
cued cat distractor) for the relatively more and less spider fearful groups with another 
independent samples t-test. No differences in disengagement were observed between the 
relatively more and less spider fearful groups (Experiment 1: t(22) = .609, p = .549; 
Experiment 2: t(23) = .814, p = .424). No differences in error rates were observed either 
(Experiment 1: t(22) = .445, p = .661; Experiment 2: t(23) = 1.562, p = .132).  
In sum, there were no differences in the mean SPQ score between experiments or 
in the behavioural results between the relatively more and less spider fearful groups within 
both experiments. Combined, these results render it unlikely that the reduction in orienting 
to and rapid disengagement from spiders in Experiment 2 can be attributed to spider fear.  
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Results from the Response Time Distributions.  
To assess whether the longer RTs in Experiment 2 as compared to Experiment 1 
could account for reduced attention to threat, we assessed orienting and disengagement 
separately for faster and slower responses. Specifically, we assessed these effects within 
each decile of the RT distributions. 
Orienting. To test whether prioritized attentional orienting to the non-cued spider 
distractors in Experiment 1 was observed across all points of the RT distribution, we 
binned distractor- and target-cued trials with a spider versus cat distractor based on RT 
(see e.g. Leber, Lechak, & Tower-Ricardi, 2013; Figure 7). The first decile (.1) contains the 
fastest 10% of response times, the second decile (.2) the second fastest 10% of response 
times, etc. Paired t-tests comparing target identification time for spider and cat distractor 
trials showed that, for the distractor-cued trials (Figure 7, first panel), the spider distractor 
slowed target identification more than the cat distractor in all deciles, with the smallest t-
value observed in the first decile (all t(23) > 2.612, all p < .017). For the target-cued trials 
(second panel), the spider distractor significantly slowed target identification in each of the 
deciles, except the last decile (t(23) = 1.270, p = .217; all other p < 0.018). 
The same analyses conducted for Experiment 2, showed that on horse distractor-
cued trials (Figure 8, first panel) the spider distractor slowed target identification in the 
intermediate deciles (.4: t(24) = 2.200, p < .038; .5: t(24) = 2.646, p < .014; .6: t(24) = 
3.057, p = .005; .7: t(24) = 3.135, p = .004), whereas it failed to do so in both the earlier 
and later deciles (all t(24) < 1.979, all p > .150). For the foil-cued trials (Figure 8, second 
panel), the spider distractor slowed target identification in the 4th and 5th deciles (.4: t(24) = 
2.629, p < .05; .5: t(24) = 2.060, p < .05), but not in any of the other deciles (all t(24) < 
1.686, all p > .104). For the validly-cued trials (Figure 8, third panel) the spider distractor 
did not delay target identification in any decile (all t(24) < 1.527, all p > .14
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Figure 7. Mean target identification time for spider and cat trials for each RT decile in Experiment 1, with the first panel showing 
distractor-cued trials and the second panel showing target-cued trials. 
 
Figure 8. Mean target identification time for spider and cat trials for each RT decile in Experiment 2, with the first panel showing 
horse distractor-cued trials, the second panel showing foil-cued trials, and the third panel showing target-cued trials.
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Disengagement. The RT distribution analysis for Experiment 1 showed that the 
spider distractor delayed target identification more than the cat distractor in all 10 deciles, 
with the smallest t-value observed in the fourth decile (all t(23) > 3.520, all p < .003; Figure 
9). Conversely, for Experiment 2, the spider distractor did not slow target identification 
more than the cat distractor in any of the RT deciles (all t < 1.863, all p > .074; see Figure 
10).  
 
 
Figure 9. Mean target identification time for spider and cat cued trials for each RT 
decile in Experiment 1. 
 
 
Figure 10. Mean target identification time for spider and cat cued trials for each RT 
decile in Experiment 2. 
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The RT distribution analyses show that the difference in result between experiments 
cannot be attributed to overall RTs being longer in Experiment 2. Rather, when spiders 
were task-relevant (Experiment 1), rapid orienting and delayed disengagement were 
observed over the entire RT distribution, indicating spider interference to be robust and not 
disproportionally driven by trials with especially fast or slow responses. When spiders were 
task-irrelevant (Experiment 2), orienting and disengagement were not more pronounced 
on trials with shorter RTs. The RT distribution analysis revealed some residual orienting to 
spiders in intermediate deciles when attention had been initially deployed to a target-
(dis)similar distractor, but not when attention had been cued to the green target. These 
results are consistent with a model in which attention to threat is modulated by top-down 
mechanisms that boost target-similar but not target-dissimilar stimuli (or perhaps even 
down-modulates the latter. See e.g. Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; see also e.g. Duncan & 
Desimone, 1995; Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010).  
The RT distributions also indicated that disengagement was perhaps more strongly 
modulated by goal-driven processes (i.e. no residual disengagement delays from the 
spider distractor in any RT decile). The present results essentially indicate that, when a 
tight top-down set is encouraged, attentional disengagement depends only on whether the 
selected stimulus is similar to the target, regardless of the threat potential of a stimulus. 
These results are in line with the view that disengagement is entirely under the command 
of top-down goals, possibly, because the perceptual analysis of selected stimuli can be 
limited to only task-relevant aspects and features (with identification initially proceeding on 
a ‘need to know’-basis for the purpose of distractor rejection; e.g., Becker, 2011; Hahn & 
Gronlund, 2007).  
The finding that individual spider fear did not modulate orienting or disengagement 
is at odds with previous studies showing, for instance, delayed disengagement in 
participants who are highly fearful of threat-related stimuli (e.g., in the dot probe task; Fox 
et al., 2001). Whereas the current study showed no modulation of threat interference or 
top-down control by spider fear, it is of note that we tested a non-phobic sample and that 
the median is a rather arbitrary divide. Thus, the present results should not be taken to 
mean that subjective fear cannot modulate orienting or disengagement. Further research 
is needed to investigate how top-down modulation of threat interference is affected in 
individuals with high (clinical) levels of spider fear, and whether fear could affect top-down 
modulation of attentional orienting and disengagement differently.  
In summary, the current study indicates that attentional orienting to threat may only 
be observed when nothing more relevant to one’s current goals is vying for attention. 
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These findings provide a new perspective on the research domain of attention to threat by 
indicating that even the early orienting of attention to threat is contingent on current top-
down goals, suggesting early orienting to threat to be more complex and cognitively 
involved than previously hypothesized. 
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Chapter 4 - Selective fear and limited time-on-task drive attentional orienting to task-
irrelevant threat distracters. 
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Abstract 
Research has shown a selective increase in prioritized attention to potential threats 
in individuals who are more fearful of the specific threat at hand (e.g. spiders). However, it 
remains to be explored whether such stimulus-specific fear modulates the pre-attentive, 
and supposedly automatic, orienting of attention (i.e. ‘attentional capture’) or the 
subsequent, and potentially more cognitively controlled, disengagement of focal attention 
from the same threat. Additionally, several studies, with a relatively higher number of 
threat presentations, have failed to show an effect of stimulus-specific fear. Thus, the 
current study explored whether such fear affected orienting and disengagement and 
whether such an effect diminished with increased time-on-task (i.e. number of threat trials). 
We used a variant of the spatial cueing paradigm to separate orienting from 
disengagement, by directing attention away from or towards a spider distractor prior to 
target presentation. The results showed that participants oriented to the spider distractor 
when it was presented at a non-cued location during the first two blocks of trials, and that 
this rapidly reduced during later phases of the experiment. And seemingly opposite 
patterns was observed for disengagement. Thus, even the pre-attentive orienting of 
attention is contingent on a stimulus its perceived threat value and fear increases orienting 
foremost with limited time-on-task. Overall, we highlight the importance of separating 
biased orienting from disengagement and monitoring how both processes evolve over time 
in the study of threat. 
Keywords: fear, spatial cueing, attentional orienting, time-on-task
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Introduction 
A widespread belief in research on emotions and attention is that humans 
automatically and rapidly attend to stimuli with a high threat value [1, 2]. Most studies have 
researched prioritized attention (i.e. attentional bias) to supposedly ‘innate’ threats such as 
spiders, snakes, and faces with a negatively valenced expression [3]. Indeed such studies 
have demonstrated that attention is prioritized to potential threats (for a review see [4]). 
For example, a seminal study by Hansen and Hansen [5] showed that a threatening (i.e. 
angry) face target was detected faster than a non-threatening (i.e. happy) face. In similar 
vein, threatening animal targets (i.e. spider or snake) are detected more rapidly than 
neutral targets (i.e. flower or mushroom) [6]. Whereas the threats in the studies above 
where relevant to the task-goal (i.e. they were the target), such prioritized attention is 
observed even when the threat stimulus is entirely irrelevant to the current task-goal (i.e. a 
task-irrelevant distractor). For example, Lipp and Waters [7] demonstrated that the 
presence of a task-irrelevant threat distractor (i.e. spider or snake) slowed detection of a 
neutral target (e.g. a cat) more than the presence of a neutral distractor (i.e. cockroach or 
lizard). In similar vein, Vromen and colleagues [8] have demonstrated that a task-irrelevant 
threat distractor (spider silhouette) slowed identification of a neutral target (bird or fish) 
more than the presence of a neutral distractor (cat silhouette). 
Whereas a threat-based explanation of prioritized attention seems intuitive, a major 
problem is that threat value and perceptual features have been confounded in the majority 
of studies. For example, the rapid detection of spiders over flowers as observed by Öhman 
and colleagues [6] could be driven, not by the spider its threat value, but by its perceptual 
features (e.g. sharp angles inherent in its long, pointy legs or higher feature contrast). 
Indeed, a role for perceptual features in prioritized attention to threat is supported by 
several studies. For example, Purcell, Stewart, and Skov [9] demonstrated that the rapid 
detection of angry faces as observed by Hansen and Hansen [5] was driven by a salient 
dark patch on these faces not by their threat value. Other studies have demonstrated that 
the rapid detection of angry schematic faces is driven by their higher local feature contrast 
in the mouth region (due to the mouth-line in these faces running perpendicular to the 
chin-line) [10]. Moreover, the rapid detection of photographic faces has been 
demonstrated to depend on the visibility of teeth, which create a locally salient region [11]. 
Perceptual features have also been shown to play a role in prioritized attention to animal 
threats. For example, the rapid detection of snakes has been shown to be contingent on 
their distinct curvilinear shape rather than their threat value as non-threatening but 
  79 
comparably curved ropes and wires were detected equally fast [12]. Thus, whereas it 
seems intuitive to assume a role for threat value, prioritized attention to threat can also be 
driven by the perceptual features inherent in such stimuli.  
More compelling evidence of a driving role for stimulus threat value in prioritized 
attention derives from studies that demonstrate that individuals who perceived a stimulus 
as relatively more threatening (i.e. who were more fearful of the threat at hand) showed a 
selective increase in threat bias. For example, socially threatening distractors (e.g. social 
threat words) delayed target responses more in socially phobic than non-phobic 
individuals [13]. In similar vein, attention to spider distractors was selectively increased in a 
relatively more spider-fearful group [14]. Indeed, a recent meta-analysis has confirmed that 
stimulus-specific fear enhances prioritized attention to feared threats [15]. Overall, such 
studies provide the most compelling evidence to date that a stimulus its subjective threat 
value can modulate attention, as low-level perceptual features of the threat are identical 
across the more and less fearful groups. 
Whereas the majority of studies have demonstrated a fear-enhanced bias, several 
other studies have failed to show such an effect and it remains unclear what drives such 
inconsistent findings [15]. Thus, whereas a stimulus its perceived threat value can drive 
attention, it remains to be explored why it does so in some studies but not in others. 
Previous studies differ in a multitude of aspects that could account for such an 
inconsistency, including the stimulus material (e.g., schematic or photorealistic), the 
number of threat (and non-threat) trials, and the paradigm (e.g., visual search or dot 
probe). To assess the effect of stimulus-specific fear on the involuntary allocation of 
attention, in the current study, we focused on prioritized attention to task-goal irrelevant 
animal threats. Animal threats (i.e. spiders and snakes) are amongst the most researched 
threat stimuli and a significant proportion of the population reports relatively high levels of 
spider or snake fear. Importantly, studies using animal threat distractors show a pattern 
similar to that observed in the overall literature: some studies do and others do not show 
selectively increased attention to the feared threat. Table 1 provides an overview of 
studies that have assessed attentional bias to animal threat distractors in relatively more 
and less spider- or snake-fearful individuals. Several studies show an increased attentional 
bias specifically to feared animal threat distractors (see table 1, upper sections) [7, 14, 16-
20], whereas others fail to show such a fear-driven enhancement (see table 1, lower 
section) [16, 21]. Studies that failed to show a fear-enhanced bias mostly differ from the 
other studies in that they included a larger number of trials and specifically more trials on 
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which a threat was presented (see Table 1 column 3). The stimulus materials (schematic 
vs. photorealistic stimuli) or the paradigm do not seem to be a distinguishing factor. A 
decrease in fear-enhanced attention with an increase in the number of threat trials seems 
in line with clinical research that has demonstrated that increased levels of fear and 
arousal to fear-congruent stimuli are diminished through repeated exposure to a feared 
threat [22]. However, such studies do not assess whether repeated exposure to a threat 
can affect attentional bias to that threat. In the current study we were particularly interested 
to assess whether fear-enhanced attention to task-goal irrelevant animal threat distractors 
is relatively stable over time or diminishes with increased time-on-task (i.e. number of 
threat trials).
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Table 1. Time-on-task effects on fear-enhanced prioritized attention to animal threat distractors. 
 
Study Fear enhances threat bias Nr. of threat trials  
(nr. of total trials) 
AVERAGE = 71 
Nr. of threat exemplars  
 (nr. times presented) 
Stimulus type Paradigm Process 
 
Devue et al. (2011) – 
Experiment 2 
 
Yes, threat bias only in HF 
 
40  (240) 
 
4  (10) 
 
Schematic spiders 
 
Additional 
singleton 
 
 
Unclear 
Gerdes et al (2008) – 
Experiment 1 
Yes, threat bias only in HF 24  (96) 24  (1) Photorealistic 
spiders 
Additional 
singleton 
 
Disengage- 
ment  
 
Kindt & Brosschot 
(1997)  
 
Yes, threat bias only in HF 
 
24  (48) 6  (4) Photorealistic 
spiders 
Stroop 
 
 
Unclear 
Kwakkenbos et al. 
(2010) 
 
 
Yes, threat bias increased 
in HF 
 
50  (150) 5  (10) Photorealistic 
spiders 
Stroop 
 
 
Unclear 
Lipp & Waters (2007) 
– Experiment 2 
 
Yes, threat bias increased 
in HF 
 
144  (216) 18: 9 spiders + 9 snakes (8) Photorealistic 
spiders + snakes 
Visual search 
 
 
Unclear 
Soares et al. (2009) 
– Experiment 2 
Yes, threat bias only in HF 144  (216) 
 
18: 9 spiders + 9 snakes  
(24) 
Photorealistic 
spiders + snakes 
Dot probe 
 
 
Unclear 
Study Mixed results  
 
Nr. of threat trials  
(nr. of total trials) 
AVERAGE = 125 
Nr. of threat exemplars  
 (nr. times presented) 
Stimulus type Paradigm Process 
 
Lipp & Derakshan 
(2005) 
 
 
Spiders: Yes, threat bias 
increased in HF 
Snakes: No, threat bias  
HF = LF 
 
 
120  (160) 
 
 
18: 9 spiders + 9 snakes  
(~8) 
 
 
 
Photorealistic 
spiders + snakes 
 
Dot Probe 
 
 
 
Unclear 
Mogg & Bradley 
(2006) 
 
200ms: Yes, threat bias 
increased in HF  
500/2000ms: No, threat 
bias HF = LF 
96  (192) 
 
 
 
24  (4) Photorealistic 
spiders 
Dot probe 
 
 
Unclear 
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Soares et al. (2015) 
 
Spiders: Yes, threat bias 
only in HF 
Snakes: No, no threat bias 
in LF nor HF 
160  (192) 
 
 
 
 
18: 9 spiders + 9 snakes  
(29) 
Photorealistic 
spiders + snakes 
Dot probe 
 
 
Unclear 
Study Fear does not enhance 
threat bias 
 
Nr. of threat trials  
(nr. of total trials) 
AVERAGE = 175 
Nr. of threat exemplars  
 (nr. times presented) 
Stimulus type Paradigm Process 
 
Devue et al. (2011) – 
Experiment 1 
 
 
No, no threat bias in LF or 
HF 
 
80  (320) 
 
4  (20) 
 
Schematic (spiders) 
 
Additional 
singleton 
 
 
Unclear 
Weymar et al. (2013) 
– spider distractor 
trials only 
 
No, threat bias HF = LF 270  (630) 
 
 
6  (45) Photorealistic 
spiders 
Visual search 
 
Unclear 
An overview of published studies assessing attention to animal threat distractors (i.e. spiders and snakes). Included in the table are 
studies that included: 1) a group of participants highly fearful of the animal threat (HF) and a group of participants who were relatively low 
in fear (LF), 2) an RT measure of target-responding on trials with and without the threat distractor, 3) adult participants, and 4) sufficient 
information to compute the number of trials with a threat stimulus and how frequently each threat exemplar was displayed. ‘=’ indicates 
equal to, ‘~’ indicates on average. 
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Another aspect worth noting is that all except one study described in Table 1 failed 
to specify the attentional process that evoked the differences between relatively more and 
less fearful participants. However, it is important in attention research to distinguish the 
early orienting response to a stimulus (i.e. attentional capture) from the later process of de-
allocation of attention from a selected stimulus (i.e. disengagement) [23]. Orienting and 
disengagement are separately controlled processes that are likely mediated by different 
systems [24] and this is for instance reflected in the fact that lesions in different portions of 
the parietal lobe selectively impair orienting or disengagement [25]. It has been argued 
that the disengagement of focal attention is completely under voluntary top-down control, 
whereas the pre-attentive orienting response may be driven more strongly by automatic, 
reflexive processes [24]. Moreover, previous research has suggested that threat stimuli 
can independently affect orienting and disengagement [8, 26]. For example, Grafton and 
MacLeod [26] have demonstrated that pre-attentive orienting to and delayed 
disengagement from threat in an anxious sample were uncorrelated. Additionally, Vromen 
and colleagues [8] have demonstrated that, whereas both orienting to and disengagement 
from threat are contingent on top-down control, orienting to threat may indeed be relatively 
less affected by task-relevance. As all except one of the previous studies described in 
table 1 did not disentangle these processes, it is currently unknown whether stimulus-
specific fear affects both attentional processes, or selectively enhances either only the pre-
attentive orienting or only subsequent delays in the disengagement of focal attention. 
Moreover, it remains an open question whether time-on-task differentially impacts orienting 
and disengagement of attention respectively.  
 Previous paradigms like visual search and dot-probe have struggled to disentangle 
the orienting of attention from the subsequent disengagement once a stimulus is attended, 
because they failed to control focal attention at the time of threat presentation (for a similar 
argument see [26-28]). For instance, in the dot probe paradigm, attentional orienting to a 
task-goal irrelevant threatening cue is inferred when the response to a subsequently 
presented neutral target is faster when it is presented in the threat location (validly-cued 
trials) compared to trials that do not contain a threatening cue [4, 29-32]. Delayed 
disengagement from the threatening cue is inferred when the target responses is slowed 
when the threat distractor and target are presented in opposite locations (invalidly-cued 
trials). However, such studies can at best achieve an incomplete separation of the early 
orienting response and subsequent disengagement, as the threat distractor is always 
presented in an initially unattended location and thus will first need to capture attention 
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before attention can be disengaged from this threat. More recent studies successfully 
achieved a separation of orienting and disengagement of attention, by employing a neutral 
(but highly effective) cue to direct attention to the threat location or another location prior to 
the presentation of the threat distractor [33-35]. Among the cues that are highly effective in 
directing attention are salient cues such as abrupt onsets [36] or cues that match the 
target-defining feature (e.g., have the same color as the pre-defined target [37]. However, 
none of these studies compared orienting and disengagement between relatively more 
and less fearful participants, so that it remains unclear whether emotional factors modulate 
orienting or disengagement. Hence, it is still an open question whether and to what extent 
fear modulates the early orienting response vs. later disengagement from threat-relevant 
stimuli. 
The Present Study 
The aim of the present study was, first, to isolate emotional from perceptual factors 
in prioritized attention to threat (i.e. spiders). Whereas perceptual factors inherent in such 
a threat should affect more and less fearful individuals alike, emotional effects should 
manifest themselves as a selective increase in prioritized attention to the threat in those 
who are more fearful of the threat at hand. Second, this study examined whether such 
emotional factors increased the pre-attentive orienting or delayed the disengagement of 
attention from a threatening, task-goal irrelevant distractors. Third, as a review of previous 
studies (see table 1) suggests that time-on-task may modulate fear-enhanced attention, 
we also assessed how both attentional processes are affected by time-on-task by 
analyzing the results separately for an early, intermediate and late phase of the 
experiment.   
To disentangle the effects of early orienting and later disengagement, we used a 
target-similar, neutral cue to control attention prior to the presentation of the threat 
distractor and target [34]. As in this previous study, the target was a green bird or fish 
picture that was presented among 3 grey-scale distractors, depicting for example a spider, 
horse, and bird. Crucially, on half of all trials, the target display contained an irrelevant 
threat distractor (spider) whereas on the other half of the trials, the target display contained 
only non-threatening distractors (e.g., cat). Participants had to identify whether the green 
target stimulus was a bird or fish, which ensured that attention would be tuned to all stimuli 
that contained the target-defining green feature (see contingent capture theory [37]. Prior 
to the search display we presented the target-colored cue (a set of four green dots) at one 
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of the possible target locations, which ensured that attention would be allocated to this 
location prior to the presentation of the target and threat distractor [38]. Note that this 
paradigm allows measuring disengagement of attention (spider versus neutral control 
stimulus cued) independently of attentional orienting (target or other distractor cued), as 
the green cue initially controls the locus of attention. Attentional orienting to the threat-
relevant spider was inferred when target identification was slower in the presence of the 
threat distractor than in its absence, when the threat distractor was presented in a non-
cued location. Elongated target identification times in the presence of a spider would 
indicate that attention was allocated to the spider before being allocated to the target [34]. 
Delayed disengagement was inferred when target identification was slower in the 
presence of the threat distractor when it appeared in the cued location. Elongated target 
identification times in the presence of a cued spider would indicate that it took longer to 
disengage attention from this spider before reorienting to the target [34].  
The efficacy of the green cue in guiding attention was confirmed by faster target 
identification times (RT) on trials where the target appeared in the cued compared to a 
non-cued location. To assess how orienting and disengagement were affected by 
stimulus-specific fear, we assessed orienting and disengagement in a relatively more and 
less spider fearful group of participants.  
 Finally, we aimed to assess whether orienting and disengagement to the threat 
distractor changed over the course of the experiment (i.e. with time-on-task and 
specifically the number of threat trials). We assessed the influence of time-on-task by 
analyzing fear-enhanced orienting and disengagement separately for each of three 
consecutive phases of the experiment (Blocks 1-3).  If increased time-on-task selectively 
reduces the ability of the spider distractor to capture attention, prioritized orienting to (non-
cued) spider distractors should decline over the course of the experiment (perhaps 
especially in the relatively more fearful participants). If time-on-task selectively reduces the 
ability of the spider to hold attention, delayed disengagement from the cued spider 
distractors should diminish over the course of the experiment (compared with pre-cueing 
of the neutral cat distractor). 
 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty participants (45 females; age M =20 years, SD =3.50) participated in return for 
course credit. Their Spider Phobia Questionnaire (SPQ) [39] scores ranged from 1 to 22 
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(M =14.207, SD =7.01). This is indicative of a sample covering the entire non-clinical range 
of spider fear on the SPQ, as the SPQ score for non-fearful individuals has been reported 
to center around 4, for those extremely fearful of spiders around 17, and above 22 for 
those with clinically relevant arachnophobia [40].  
Questionnaires 
Spider Phobia Questionnaire (SPQ) 
The 31-item SPQ was used to evaluate self-reported fear of spiders [39]. Each of its 
31 items requires a ‘true’ or ‘false’ response. Following standard scoring procedures, each 
response was scored as 0 or 1. Total scores could range from 0 to 31, with higher scores 
indicating greater fear of spiders.  
Picture fear & arousal questionnaire 
The picture fear and arousal questionnaire consisted of a selection of two spider, 
cat, bird, and fish pictures each that were used in the spatial cueing task. Each animal 
picture was presented individually and followed by 2 questions: ‘How scary do you find this 
picture?’ and ‘how arousing do you find this picture?’. Participants answered each 
question by moving a pointer to a specific position on a 170 mm Visual Analogue Scale 
(VAS) ranging from ‘Not at all scary’ to ‘Very scary’ (question 1) or ‘Not at all arousing’ to 
‘Very arousing’ (question 2). Ratings were scored by measuring the distance from the 
leftmost point of the scale to a participant’s mark (in mm), with higher numbers reflecting 
that the picture was rated as more threatening (question 1) or more arousing (question 2).  
Materials 
Stimulus presentation was controlled by DMDX [41]. Stimuli were presented on a 
Dell Optiplex 780 computer with a 19-in. color monitor, a resolution of 1,024 x 768 pixels, 
and a refresh rate of 85Hz. The participants viewed the monitor from a distance of 60 cm. 
Responses were collected through the left and right shift keys on a QWERTY keyboard 
and each experimental block was initiated by a space bar press.  
Stimuli 
 Forty-two animal pictures, each measuring 3 x 2.6 cm were selected from previous 
experiments conducted in the Emotion, Learning, and Psychophysiology Laboratory at 
The University of Queensland. All animals depicted were equated in size so that each 
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covered an area of approximately 2011 pixels and they were presented against a uniform 
white background. The thirty pictures that served as distractors were color-corrected in 
grey-scale (average grey value of 101 on a scale where 0 reflects black and 255 reflects 
white). They consisted of 6 spider, cat, horse, bird, and fish pictures each. The remaining 
12 target pictures were color corrected in green-scale. They consisted of 6 bird and 6 fish 
pictures.  
The target display consisted of 4 animal pictures: three grey-scale distractor 
pictures and a single green bird or fish target. The animal pictures were presented within 
placeholder boxes (3 x 2.6 cm) that were arranged in a cross-like configuration with the 
center of its nearest side 5 cm away from the central fixation cross (see Fig 1). The cue 
display consisted of the four placeholder boxes, the central fixation cross, and a color cue. 
The color cue comprised a set of four green squares (0.5 x 0.5 cm each), presented in a 
diamond-shaped configuration around one of the placeholder boxes. The green color 
value of the color cue was identical to the average color value of the bird and fish targets.  
 
Fig 1. Each trial consisted of the following display sequence (from bottom left to top right): 
fixation, color cue, fixation, target display, and a blank screen. Different trial types differed 
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only with regard to the positioning of the target and distractors in the target display and the 
cue location. The displayed example is a target-cued (fish) trial with a spider distractor.  
 
Design 
The green cue was presented at each of the four placeholder boxes with equal 
probability and was non-predictive of the target location. Target displays always contained 
a bird picture and a fish picture, one of which was presented as the green target and the 
other as a grey-scale distractor (50-50%). Target displays also contained a grey-scale 
horse distractor. The fourth distractor was either a grey-scale cat or a grey-scale spider 
(each on 50% of trials). Each animal picture was presented with equal likelihood in each of 
the placeholder boxes. Six different exemplars of each animal species were shown in a 
between-subjects design.  
Contingent on which animal picture was presented in the cued placeholder box, 
four trial types can be distinguished and each made up 25% of the total number of trials 
(See Fig 2): 1) target-cued trials where a green-scale target picture (fish or bird) was cued, 
2) horse-cued trials where a grey-scale horse distractor was cued, 3) spider/cat-cued trials 
where a grey-scale spider or cat distractor was cued, and 4) foil-cued trials where a foil 
(grey-scale bird or fish) was cued. Thus the experiment consisted of a 4 × 2 within 
subjects design with the conditions cued picture [target, spider/cat, horse, foil] and 
distractor identity [spider, cat]. Target-, horse-, and foil-cued trials assess orienting to 
spider distractors (relative to cat distractor trials). Spider/cat-cued trials, in which attention 
is allocated to the spider/cat distractor, assess delayed disengagement from spider 
distractors. Trial order was randomized for each participant and the stimulus-to-response 
mapping was counterbalanced across participants.  
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Fig 2. Top panel: an example of a target display with a spider distractor and the same 
example with a cat distractor. Bottom left panel: an example of the cue display for each of 
the three types of orienting trials: target-cued, foil-cued, and horse distractor-cued. A 
spider orienting score was computed by subtracting target identification time on trials with 
a non-cued cat distractor from the trials with a non-cued spider distractor. Bottom right 
panel: an example of the cue display for the disengagement trials. A spider 
disengagement score was computed by subtracting target identification time on trials with 
a cued cat distractor from the trials with a cued spider distractor. 
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Procedure 
Participants were individually familiarized with the experimental procedure by 
means of written and oral instructions. At the start of the modified cueing task participants 
were instructed to identify as quickly and accurately as possible whether the single green-
scale picture on each trial depicted a bird or a fish by pressing the left or right shift key, 
respectively. Participants were also informed about the task-irrelevant distractors and 
instructed to ignore them. 
On each trial, the fixation display (for 882 ms) was followed by the cue display (82 
ms), the fixation display (82 ms), the target display (47 ms), and the presentation of a 
blank screen for another 882 ms. Participants completed 12 training trials and 288 test 
trials. Test trials were grouped into 3 blocks of 96 trials each (48 of them with a spider 
distractor) and separated by a break. After completing the modified cueing task, 
participants completed the SPQ and the picture fear and arousal ratings.   
Results 
Picture fear & arousal questionnaire 
Fifty-six participants completed the picture fear and arousal questionnaire. 
Participants rated the animals as differentially fear-provoking, as indicated by a significant 
effect of animal picture in a one-way ANOVA, F(4,56) =34.51, p <.001, partial η2 =.78. 
Follow-up paired t-tests showed that spider pictures (M =89) were rated as more fear-
provoking than any of the other pictures (cat: M =12, t(55) =11.54, p <.001; bird: M =16, 
t(55) =13.30, p <.001; fish: M =16, t(55) =12.27, p <.001; horse: M =12, t(55) =12.86, p 
<.001). None of the other ratings differed from one another significantly (all ps > 0.05). 
These and all other t-tests reported in this paper were two-tailed. Surprisingly, those 
participants who rated the spider pictures as more threatening where not necessarily those 
who scored higher on spider fear as measured by the SPQ as was indicated by the 
absence of a positive correlation between the spider picture fear ratings and SPQ scores 
(r(56) =.03, p =.83). 
A second one-way ANOVA showed that the arousal ratings also differed across 
animal pictures, F(4,56) =4.45, p <.05, partial η2 =.91. Spider pictures (M =62) were rated 
as more arousing than the other pictures (birds: M =32, t(20) =4.06, p <.001; fish: M =31, 
t(20) =4.10, p <.001; cats: M =38, t(20) =2.88, p <.05; horse: M =33, t(20) =3.26, p <.05). 
Again, participants who rated the spider pictures as more arousing were not necessarily 
those who reported being more fearful of spiders as indicated by the absence of a positive 
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correlation between the spider picture arousal ratings and SPQ scores (r(56) =.16, p =.27). 
Color cue 
To assess whether the green cue effectively guided attention in each of the three 
blocks, we conducted three t-tests that compared target identification time on target- and 
distractor-cued trials. The t-tests showed that in each of the 3 blocks, target identification 
was significantly faster on target-cued trials (block 1: 139 ms faster; block 2: 69 ms; block 
3: 56 ms, all ps <.001). These results confirmed that the green cue effectively directed 
attention throughout the experiment.  
Orienting to spider distractors 
First we assessed whether target identification times on trials were the spider was 
presented in a non-cued location differed depending on whether the target, horse, or foil 
was cued. The two-way ANOVA showed no significant interaction effect of cued picture 
(validly cued, horse-distractor cued, foil cued) and distractor animal (spider or cat) on the 
RTs, F(2,58) =1.45, p =.24, partial η2 =.30. Therefore in subsequent analyses, we pooled 
the orienting scores over these three trial types. 
 To assess attentional orienting to spider distractors across the three blocks, we 
calculated a spider orienting score by subtracting the average target identification time on 
trials with a non-cued cat distractor from trials with a non-cued spider distractor. A positive 
orienting score indicates that the spider distractor slowed target identification when it was 
presented in a non-cued location (i.e. it captured attention), whereas a negative orienting 
score indicates avoidance or filtering (Becker, 2007).  
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of block on the spider orienting 
score (F(2,58) =4.21, p <.05, partial η2 =.71). Follow-up one-sample t-tests revealed that 
the spider orienting score was significantly larger than zero in block 1 (15 ms, t(59) =2.97, 
p <.05) and 2 (15 ms, t(59) =2.60, p <.05), but not in block 3 (-3 ms, t(59) =.59, p =.56; see 
Fig 3, leftmost panel). Corroborating this pattern of results, paired t-tests revealed that the 
spider orienting score was significantly larger in block 1 and 2 than in block 3 (mean 
differences: 18 ms, t(59) =2.42, p <.05 & 18 ms, t(59) =2.37, p <.05), whereas no 
difference was observed between blocks 1 and 2 (mean difference: 0 ms, t(59) =0.01, p 
=.99; see Fig 3, leftmost panel).  
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Fig 3. The orienting to task-irrelevant spider distractors was observed when analyzing the 
entire sample (left) in earlier, but not later task blocks. The orienting pattern with increased 
time-on-task was not strongly modulated by spider fear with orienting disappearing with 
increased time-on-task in the relatively more spider fearful group (middle) as well as in the 
less fearful group (right). Orienting scores above 0 indicate attention towards spider 
distractors, whereas scores below 0 indicate attention away from spiders. ** is significant 
with a p-value < 0.01. * is significant with a p-value < 0.05.  
Spider fear 
To assess whether orienting to the spider distractor was contingent on spider fear, 
we carried out a median split analysis. Participants with a total SPQ score of 15 or above 
were included in the relatively more spider fearful group, whereas the remaining 
participants were included in the relatively less fearful group. We then compared the spider 
orienting scores across both groups for each of the three blocks using three independent 
samples t-tests. No group differences in spider orienting score were observed for any of 
the blocks (block 1: mean difference: 12 ms, t(58) =1.26, p =.214; block 2: mean 
difference: -1 ms, t(58) =-1.11, p =.912; block 3: mean difference: -7 ms, t(58) =.66, p 
=.52).  
Disengagement from spider distractors 
To assess delayed disengagement from spider distractors, we calculated a spider 
disengagement score for each block, by subtracting the average target identification time 
on cat-cued trials from the average target identification time on spider-cued trials. Thus, a 
positive disengagement score indicated delayed disengagement from spider distractors, 
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whereas a negative disengagement score indicated facilitated disengagement. 
First, a one-way ANOVA did not show a significant effect of block on the spider 
disengagement score, F(2,60) =2.81, p =.07, partial η2 =.09. Second, three one-sample t-
tests demonstrated that the spider disengagement score did not differ from 0 in the first 
block (block 1: -5 ms, t(59) =-.39, p =.70), but was significantly larger than 0 in later blocks 
(block 2: 28 ms, t(59) =2.96, p <.05; block 3: 17 ms, t(59) =2.12, p <.05). Third, we 
compared the spider disengagement scores for each block across the more and less 
spider fearful groups with three independent samples t-tests. No differences between the 
two groups emerged (block 1: mean difference: 12 ms, t(58) =.52, p =.61; block 2: mean 
difference: 22 ms, t(58) =1.16, p =.25; block 3: mean difference: 23 ms, t(58) =1.38, p 
=.17). Together these results provide evidence that the task-irrelevant spider distractors 
did not delay disengagement in the earlier block of the current experiment, but started to 
do so in the later two blocks. 
Overall error rates 
Parallel analyses for the error rates yielded no significant results other than a main 
effect of block, F(2,58) =13.83, p <.001, partial η2 =.32. Follow-up paired t-tests showed 
that the error rate in block 1 (M =13) was higher than in block 2 (M =10, t(59) =3.47, p 
<.05), and higher in block 2 than in block 3 (M =8, t(59) =3.64, p < .05).  
General Discussion 
Previous research has proposed that orienting and disengagement may be 
mediated by different systems [24] that are differentially affected by a stimulus’ threat 
value [8, 26]. The current study shows additional support for this notion by demonstrating 
that time-on-task has a differential effect on the orienting to and the disengagement from 
threat. The current study disentangled orienting and disengagement by controlling focal 
attention at the time of threat onset, such that attention was either at the threat location 
(disengagement trials) or at a different location (orienting trials). The results of the current 
study extend earlier studies by showing that orienting to spider distractors decreased with 
increased time-on-task, whereas a seemingly opposite effect of time-on-task was 
observed for disengagement. Importantly, these findings may help shed light on why some 
previous studies with a larger number of threat trials may have failed to observe prioritized 
orienting to threat [16, 21]. 
Orienting to threat distractors 
The current study demonstrates that the orienting of attention to an initially 
unattended threat distractor (i.e. spider) is contingent on time-on-task. Specifically, 
prioritized orienting was observed in the earlier stages of the experiment but rapidly 
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disappeared in later stages. This extends previous research, using visual search, dot-
probe, and additional singleton tasks, that have shown potentially contradictory results 
regarding orienting to threat (see table 1).  
Individual fear for the specific threat stimulus employed did not affect the pattern of 
results that was observed. Such an absence of fear-enhanced orienting is in line with two 
previous studies that have proposed that animal-specific fear may only delay the later 
disengagement of focal attention, but not the early orienting of attention [17, 47]. The first 
study, by Miltner and colleagues [47] demonstrated that animal-specific fear selectively 
enhanced ERP components that are associated with relatively late attentional processes 
(e.g. P3 and the late positive complex), whereas ERP components associated with earlier 
processes were unaffected (e.g. N1, P2, N2). The second study, by Gerdes and 
colleagues [17] presented the threat distractor in an initially unattended location and they 
failed to observe fear-enhanced orienting specific to the threat distractor. However, they 
did observe fear-enhanced orienting to all distractors regardless of whether it was the 
feared stimulus (i.e. rapid orienting to spider and flower distractors alike in spider fearful 
individuals). Such a general increase in interference has been repeatedly demonstrated in 
anxiety [48] and is usually attributed to impaired goal-driven control of attention or 
response selection [49]. Whereas anxiety and stimulus-specific fear are quite distinct, we 
assessed whether stimulus-specific fear was accompanied by a general slowing. If this is 
the case, increased spider fear should be accompanied by an overall delay in target 
responding, even in the absence of a threat distractor (see e.g. [48]). Indeed, when we 
compared RTs for trials with neutral distractors only, target identification in the high-fearful 
group was found to be significantly slowed. Whereas the current study cannot disentangle 
whether such overall slowing was driven by decreased control on attention or motor 
responding, this result suggests that stimulus-specific fear may potentially be 
characterized by a more general response slowing, even in the absence of any threat.  
Time-on-Task 
Prioritized orienting of attention to spider distractors was observed during the earlier 
stages of the experiment (block 1 and block 2; 48 trials with threat each) and such 
prioritized orienting rapidly diminished with increased time-on-task (blocks 3; see Fig 3). 
Such a reduction in prioritized orienting to threat with increased time-on-task can shed light 
on why several studies have observed prioritized attention to threats (see e.g. table 1) [7, 
14, 16-20], whereas others have failed to show such an effect [16, 21]. As table 1 shows, 
the average number of threat trials was relatively low in some studies that demonstrated 
prioritized attention to animate threat distractors (71), intermediate in studies showing 
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mixed results (125), and relatively high in studies that failed to show prioritized attention to 
threat (175). Other factors like the stimulus materials (schematic vs. photorealistic stimuli) 
or paradigm did not seem to be a distinguishing factor between these studies. Of note, the 
number of studies in the latter category is limited, likely due to such null results being less 
likely to be published.  
There are several mechanisms that could drive a reduction in orienting with 
increased time-on-task. Presenting a feared threat stimulus over repeated trials could 
reduce the fear response in a bottom-up fashion, e.g. through habituation, up to the point 
where the (salient features inherent in the) threat cease to capture attention. Such a 
bottom-up driven explanation would be in line with fMRI studies that have shown 
diminished amygdala responding to a threat that has been passively viewed over repeated 
trials [50, 51]. Alternatively, a reduction in orienting with increased time-on-task effect 
could be due to an increase in the recruitment of top-down control with increased time-on-
task. This would be in line with previous research showing that the presence of a threat 
impairs the recruitment of goal-driven control, but that such a deficit can be overcome 
when goal-driven control is a prerequisite for successful task performance (i.e. in highly 
taxing experimental blocks) [48].  
Though orienting is contingent on time-on-task, it is unlikely to be the only 
processes that affects whether orienting to threat is observed. Specifically, time-on-task 
cannot explain the findings of studies that showed mixed results (see Table 1, middle 
section). Both Lipp and Derakshan [14] and Soares et al. [52] showed differential results 
for spider and snake threats. Since the number of spider and snake trials was identical, 
time-on-task cannot explain this inconsistency. Instead differences in target-distractor 
dissimilarity could potentially explain these results. Specifically, the more distinct a 
distractor its features are from the target, the more effectively such a distractor may be 
inhibited in the competition for attention. For example, in the study by Soares and 
colleagues [52], the elongated curvilinear snake distractor was more dissimilar from the 
rounded, compact mushroom target than the spider distractor and thus snake distractors 
may have been inhibited more successfully. Indeed such a proposal is supported by the 
faster target detection in the presence of snake than spider distractors.  
Delayed disengagement from threat distractors 
The current study also showed evidence for delayed disengagement of focal 
attention from the spider distractor. Specifically, whilst the task-irrelevant spider distractors 
did not delay disengagement in the earliest block, they did delay disengagement in the 
later two blocks. Such discrepant effect of stimulus-specific fear on orienting and 
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disengagement that we observed in the current study again highlights the importance of 
studying both processes separately. Though it is important to note that the current 
paradigm may have been less sensitive to measuring fear-driven delays in 
disengagement, since the task encouraged the rapid de-allocation of attention from any 
distractor and swift re-allocation to the target in order to ensure successful target 
completion through the brief target presentation and pop-out target color. Overall, the 
current results suggest that the later disengagement of attention may indeed be a process 
that is more susceptible to top-down processes than the early orienting of attention. 
Future research directions 
 It remains an open question whether reduced orienting to a task-goal irrelevant 
threat with increased time-on-task is driven by habituation to salient features inherent in 
the threat, or by a more cognitively-involved process like increased efficiency of top-down 
target-selection. Both accounts could be tested in a design similar to the current study with 
two trial blocks. If habituation drives reduced orienting, spider capture should be reduced 
in block 2 for a group that trained with the same spider exemplar in block 1, but not for a 
group that trained with a featurally-distinct spider exemplar in block 1. If more efficient 
target selection drives reduced orienting, then spider capture in block 2 should be 
comparable for a group that trained in block 1 with the target and spider distractor and for 
a group that trained with only the target and neutral distractors. 
Furthermore, future research may want to investigate whether orienting to threat 
distractors is indeed feature-driven. The use of ‘innate’ threats like spiders and snakes 
may not be ideal for this purpose since it is difficult to extract and manipulate specific 
features inherent in complex stimuli. Instead, a differential conditioning procedure with 
simple geometric shapes may be more suitable for addressing this question. One could 
differentially condition one initially neutral geometric shape (e.g. blue square) with a 
negative valence (CS+), whereas a second shape would remain neutral (e.g. yellow 
triangle; CS-). Following conditioning, both the threatening and neutral geometric shape 
could be presented as distractors in the modified cueing paradigm. Firstly, one could 
assess whether the threatening CS+ (e.g. blue square) indeed captured attention more 
than the neutral CS-, akin to the spider capturing attention in the current study. 
Subsequently, one could present a distractor that contained only one of the CS+ features 
(e.g. blue or square) and assess whether such a stimulus also captures attention (as 
compared to a stimulus that contains the respective CS- feature, e.g. yellow or triangle). If 
individual features drive orienting to the threat distractor, even such new stimuli to which 
no fear response has been conditioned but that contains a CS+ feature should capture 
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attention. Finally, one could assess whether such features are rated (both explicitly as well 
as implicitly) as more threatening. 
Concluding remarks 
The current study demonstrates that time-on-task differentially modulates the pre-
attentive orienting and the subsequent disengagement of attention. Priortized orienting to 
threat was only observed during the early stages of the task, whereas no such orienting 
was observed at later stages. Such a decrease in orienting with increased time-on-task 
can reconcile seemingly inconsistent findings of previous studies (see table 1). A 
seemingly, opposite effect of time-on-task was observed for the disengagement of 
attention. Consequently, the current study highlights that it is vital to disentangle the early 
orienting and subsequent disengagement of attention in the processing of threat.
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In this thesis I investigate the influence of top-down processes on visual attention to 
threat. Specifically I assess the influence of top-down goals on the early, pre-attentive 
orienting of attention to threat, as well as the later disengagement of focal attention from 
the same threat. First, I have demonstrated that top-down task-goals can modulate the 
disengagement of focal attention from an initially attended threat distractor (chapters 2 & 
3). Second, I have demonstrated that top-down task-goals modulate the pre-attentive 
orienting of attention to an initially unattended threat distractor (chapter 3), though 
potentially less strongly. Third, I have demonstrated that (residual) orienting to a goal-
irrelevant threat is contingent on the time-on-task. 
In the conclusions chapter, I will first discuss the influence of top-down processes 
on the disengagement of focal attention from an attended threat. Second, I will discuss the 
influence of top-down processes on the pre-attentive orienting of attention to an initially 
unattended threat. I will highlight how these findings relate to important questions in the 
domain of threat processing and how these results fit with existing models of attention to 
threat. Third, I will briefly discuss how the modified cueing paradigm that I developed has 
been crucial in investigating these questions. Fourth, I will elaborate on how the findings 
described in this thesis fit with prominent theories of threat processing and visual spatial 
attention. I will point out that none of the existing theories explicitly models all of the 
observed results, especially not those relating to the pre-attentive orienting to potential 
threats. I will propose a feature-driven mechanism for such rapid pre-attentive orienting of 
attention to threat. Fifth, I will briefly discuss some open questions that remain to be 
addressed and provide some directions for future research. 
 
Top-down modulation of the disengagement from threat 
 In this thesis, I demonstrate that top-down task-goals can modulate the 
disengagement of focal attention from an initially attended threat distractor (chapters 2 & 
3). Specifically, when the threat identity was relevant to the task-goal, the threat distractor 
delayed disengagement (more than a goal-relevant neutral stimulus), whereas the same 
threat distractor failed to delay disengagement when it was goal-irrelevant. Such top-down 
modulation was observed regardless of the featural richness of the threat distractor and 
target (i.e. with silhouettes as well as photorealistic stimuli). Top-down control of 
disengagement seems evident even in participants who were fearful of the threat at hand, 
as they did not show a delay in disengagement from the task-goal irrelevant threat either 
(chapter 4). Overall, these results suggest that disengagement from threat is contingent on 
top-down goals.  
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Top-down contingent disengagement of focal attention seems in line with the result 
from the only previous study that simultaneously manipulated the top-down goal and 
disentangled the disengagement of focal attention from other processes that are involved 
in threat processing (i.e. orienting; Vogt et al., 2013; Experiment 1). This study by Vogt and 
colleagues (2013) primarily focussed on assessing whether attention would be prioritized 
to a goal-irrelevant threat or a goal-relevant neutral distractor, but the results from their first 
experiment can be used to assess the effect top-down goals on disengagement from a 
threat distractor. Vogt and colleagues employed the double cueing (i.e. dot-probe) 
paradigm, in which the (threat) distractors are always irrelevant to the task-goal of locating 
or identifying a subsequently presented, neutral target (though one cannot rule out that 
some participants may hold the erroneous belief that the threat may be indicative of the 
target location). To manipulate the relevance of the threat distractor to the top-down goal, 
they interleaved the cueing task with a secondary goal task in which the threat distractor 
could be either goal-relevant or –irrelevant. The threat distractor was goal-relevant in this 
secondary task when it was the stimulus that required a button press in order to collect a 
monetary reward. The threat distractor was goal-irrelevant in the secondary task when it 
did not require a response and did not influence the monetary reward. In line with top-
down modulation of disengagement, target responses on disengagement trials in the 
cueing task (i.e. trials where the target appeared in the opposite location from the threat 
distractor), were 17 ms slower when the threat was goal-relevant compared to when it was 
goal-irrelevant (512 vs. 495 ms). Thus, disengagement from the threat distractor seemed 
to be reduced when it was irrelevant to the current task-goal. However, both the goal-
relevant and goal-irrelevant threat distractor, delayed disengagement compared to neutral 
distractors (469 ms). This suggests that disengagement is contingent on top-down goals, 
but that even a goal-irrelevant threat can delay disengagement (though to a lesser 
degree). However, it remains unclear whether these differences were indeed significant as 
they were not compared directly. The study by Vogt and colleagues (2013) nevertheless 
provides some evidence that top-down goals may modulate the disengagement of 
attention from threat distractors. 
 
Task characteristics influence top-down modulation of disengagement from threat 
The failure of a goal-irrelevant threat distractor to delay disengagement in the 
modified cueing paradigm that was employed in this thesis (chapters 2 and 3) may seem 
at odds with the reduced, but still sizeable, delay in disengagement from goal-irrelevant 
threat distractor as observed by Vogt and colleagues (2013). Moreover, at first, the failure 
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of a goal-irrelevant threat distractor to delay disengagement seems at odds with the 
delayed disengagement from goal-irrelevant threats that has been demonstrated in studies 
employing the dot-probe (see e.g. Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Carlson & Reinke, 2014), 
visual search (Gerdes, Alpers, & Pauli, 2007), and other paradigms (e.g. additional 
singleton; Belopolsky, Devue, & Theeuwes, 2011; Georgiou et al., 2005). However, in 
such previous studies the need for top-down control of disengagement from an attended 
distractor was relatively low, whereas the need for such top-down control was much higher 
in the studies that are part of this thesis. Specifically, in previous studies the need for top-
down control was likely limited as prolonged dwell on the distractor was unlikely to impair 
successful goal-completion (i.e. target responding), whereas in the current studies 
prolonged dwell was more likely to impair goal-completion. For example, in the dot-probe 
paradigm, delayed disengagement from the threat distractor will at most slow the target 
identification but not prevent it, since distractor and target are presented sequentially and 
the target is presented for an extended period of time (typically 200-500 ms; see e.g. Fox, 
Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Georgiou et al., 2005; Carlson & Reinke, 2014). In the visual 
search paradigm, where the distractor and target are presented simultaneously, delayed 
disengagement from the threat distractor would again not jeopardize successful target 
identification since stimuli are typically presented until a response is made (Gerdes, 
Alpers, & Pauli, 2007).  
In similar vein, the paradigm employed by Belopolsky and colleagues (2011) 
presented a single stimulus until a response was made. Therefore, delayed 
disengagement from the goal-irrelevant (threat) distractor is not at odds with attainment of 
the top-down goal and thus there is no need to exert strong top-down control on the 
disengagement of focal attention. Consequently, delayed disengagement from a goal-
irrelevant threat when there is limited need for top-down control is not at odds with the 
proposal that top-down processes can modulate disengagement from threat when there is 
a need for top-down control (e.g. when demands on the attentional system are increased 
or when the a focus on target features is essential to task-completion).  
Indeed, the modified cueing paradigm employed in the current thesis, tests whether 
top-down processes can modulate disengagement when there is a need for top-down 
control to aid successful goal-attainment. In the modified cueing paradigm, there is a 
stronger need for top-down control on disengagement from an attended distractor since 
the distractors and target are presented simultaneously for a brief period of time (50-
100ms). The potentially more challenging nature of the current experiments is supported 
by a higher overall error rate in the experiments included in this thesis (around 10%) as 
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compared to previous experiments (ranging from below 1% in Fox et al., 2002 to 4.7% in 
Carlson & Reinke, 2014). Moreover, in the current studies the target was defined by a 
salient (pop-out) color, which should further encourage the adoption of a strict top-down 
set for the target color and a swift disengagement of attention from any distractor that does 
not feature this color, including threats (see e.g. Folk & Remington, 2008) and boost the 
target activation in the competition for attention. In contrast, in the study by Gerdes and 
colleagues (2008), stimuli were presented until a response was made and the distractors 
were presented in a salient (red) color, whereas the target was presented in a less salient 
grey. Moreover in this study the threat distractor was the only stimulus that was 
characterized by its abrupt onset and thus even further boosted in the competition for 
attention. Thus, it seems that top-down modulation of disengagement from threat may only 
be observed in paradigms where top-down control aids goal-completion and where the 
target is the relatively more salient feature.   
The studies included in this thesis suggest that top-down modulation of 
disengagement is observed irrespective of stimulus features, as top-down modulation was 
observed with simplistic silhouettes and photorealistic threats Moreover, top-down 
modulation was observed regardless of the threat distractor its threat value, as 
disengagement delays from a goal-irrelevant threat were absent even in individuals who 
perceived the threat as relatively more threatening (i.e. more spider-fearful). These results 
do not preclude that disengagement in clinically phobic participants or from extremely 
threatening stimuli could be relatively less affected by top-down processes.  
 
Top-down contingent disengagement contradicts strong versions of the threat 
module. 
Such top-down modulation of disengagement, contradicts strong version of a threat 
module which propose that threat processing is solely driven by stimulus-driven processes 
(e.g. stimulus threat value or salience) and encapsulated from top-down influences (see 
encapsulation hypothesis, Öhman & Mineka, 2001). The encapsulation hypothesis 
proposes that once the threat module has been activated, even relatively later stages 
involved in threat processing (i.e. focused attention) will be impenetrable to conscious 
cognitive influences and control. Evidence for such encapsulation has been provided 
foremost by fear-conditioning studies that have failed to show an influence of explicit 
verbal instructions on extinction of conditioned fear to threats. For example, the explicit 
instruction that no more shocks will be administered following the presentation of neutral 
pictures (flowers and mushrooms) rapidly extinguishes the fear response to such pictures. 
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However, such verbal instruction does not affect extinction of the fear response to threat 
pictures (e.g. spiders and snakes; Hugdahl & Öhman, 1977; Lipp & Edwards, 2002). Such 
studies indeed suggest that responding to threat stimuli can be more resistant to top-down 
influences than responding to neutral stimuli. However, these studies may not provide the 
best test of whether threat processing is necessarily encapsulated from cognitive top-down 
control since there is no cost of the continued fear responses to goal-completion. 
Consequently, the need to implement top-down control to override such threat responses 
is low and it remains an open question whether verbal instruction could rapidly extinguish 
the fear response to threat pictures if such rapid extinction would be clearly beneficial for 
goal-completion.  
Previous research has indicated that top-down control is recruited to resolve 
processing conflicts that arise when more stimuli are present than can be processed (see 
e.g. Egner & Hirsch, 2005). In conditioning experiments no such conflict is present thus 
they may not be the most suitable to test the strong assumption that threat processing is 
encapsulated from top-down control. The cueing experiments of chapter 2 likely do induce 
such a processing conflict, as prioritized processing of the threat distractor would likely 
hinder attainment of the top-down task-goal. Thus the latter type of set-up is more suitable 
to assess whether recruitment of top-down processes has the potential to modulate threat 
processing.  
Top-down modulation of disengagement as observed in chapter 2 does not 
necessarily contradict more moderate versions of a threat module (e.g. low vs high road 
hypothesis LeDoux, 1996). Such accounts propose that top-down processes may affect 
the later stages of threat processing, e.g. the disengagement of focal attention, as even 
potential threats are eventually cognitively evaluated in the cortex. In order to test more 
moderate versions of the threat module, one would have to assess whether top-down 
goals can affect processes that commence at an earlier stage of threat processing, e.g. 
the pre-attentive orienting of attention (see distinction low vs. high Road; LeDoux, 1996). 
This will be further discussed below in the section that reviews the results from chapter 3. 
 
Top-down modulation of the pre-attentive orienting to threat 
Top-down modulation of disengagement as observed in chapter 2 demonstrates 
that the processing of simplistic threats, under conditions of focal attention, is contingent 
on top-down goals. However, it remains unclear whether top-down goals can modulate the 
pre-attentive orienting of attention to potential threats. More moderate versions of a threat 
module have proposed that it is specifically these early stages of threat processing that 
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may proceed automatically and unaffected by cognitive influences (low road, LeDoux, 
1996), whereas later stages of threat processing may be under cognitive control (high 
road, LeDoux, 1996). This is in line with the general notion of decreased top-down and 
increased bottom-up driven processing as dedicated sensory regions in the visual 
processing hierarchy are approached. As such, the initial feed-forward sweep of neural 
representations in early visual regions should be relatively less affected by (though not 
independent from) the goal-relevance of a stimulus and relatively more stimulus-reliant 
than representations in later visual regions or in these same early visual regions after 
feedback inputs (Carrasco, 2011).  
In chapter 3 I demonstrated that top-down goals can modulate orienting to 
photorealistic threat distractors. Specifically, when the threat distractor its identity was 
relevant to the current task-goal, it captured attention. Such capture was much reduced 
when the same threat distractor its identity was goal-irrelevant. Such goal-driven 
modulation of orienting to a threat contradicts the idea that the early stages of threat 
processing are solely driven by stimulus-driven processes and encapsulated from top-
down influences and thus contradicts even more moderate versions of a threat module 
(see automaticity hypothesis, Öhman & Mineka, 2001; see low road, LeDoux, 1996).  
Such moderate versions of a threat module which have suggested that especially 
the early stages of threat processing are unaffected by cognitive processes, have drawn 
heavily on research that has demonstrated that conditioned fear responses to threat 
stimuli rare observed irrespective of conscious cognitive processes. For example, 
enhanced fear responses are observed to consciously perceived, but also to subliminally 
presented or backward masked threats (see e.g. Öhman, Dimberg, & Esteves, 1989; 
Öhman & Soares, 1993). Moreover, explicit instructions that no more shocks will be 
delivered do not speed extinction of the conditioned fear response to threat stimuli, 
whereas it does speed extinction for neutral stimuli (Hugdahl & Öhman, 1977). Whereas, 
these results suggest that threats can be prioritized for processing in the presence as well 
as absence of conscious awareness or knowledge of such stimuli, I would argue that 
these results do not demonstrate that such early processes cannot be affected by top-
down influences.  
Top-down modulation of orienting is in line with the model proposed by Mathews & 
Mackintosh (1998) and current theories of visual spatial attention such as the Guided 
Search model (Wolfe, 1994) and the biased competition model (e.g., Duncan & 
Humphreys, 1989). These theories predict that even attention to highly salient stimuli can 
be 1) up- or down-modulated by top-down controlled processes, and 2) would be subject 
  111 
to competition with other stimuli that are currently attended. However, theories of attention 
do not specifically model attention to threat and they propose that only elementary 
features (e.g. green, round) can be processed pre-attentively. Consequently, a stimulus its 
threat value or identity cannot be evaluated pre-attentively (early selection accounts; e.g., 
Treisman & Gelade, 1980).  
 
The role of stimulus features / threat value 
Top-down modulation of orienting to threat distractors as observed in Chapter 3 
contrasts the absence of such an effect in chapter 2. One main difference was that the 
experiments described in chapter 3 used multiple photorealistic threats, whereas the 
experiments in chapter 2 used a single silhouette. Thus it seems that an interaction of top-
down and bottom-up processes determine whether rapid orienting to threat distractors is 
observed. When the threat distractor was goal-irrelevant, orienting was not observed 
regardless of the threat distractor’s salience. However, when the threat distractor was 
goal-relevant, rapid orienting was observed to photorealistic but not a silhouette threat. 
Consequently, orienting may be dependent on a richness in stimulus features that is 
observed only in photorealistic threat stimuli (e.g. color). Alternatively, rapid orienting may 
only be observed with threats that have a relatively higher threat-value. The former 
explanation would be in line with biased competition accounts of attention (e.g., Duncan & 
Humphreys, 1989). Photorealistic threats would be expected to lead to a sufficiently strong 
stimulus-driven activation to outweigh the activation of the green target-stimulus, and to be 
further up-modulated by top-down processes because of their target-similarity, and thus 
capture attention.  
At first, reduced orienting to goal-irrelevant threat distractors may seem inconsistent 
with previous studies that have suggested that attention can be oriented rapidly to goal-
irrelevant threats (Lipp & Waters, 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Öhman & Mineka, 2001; 
Rinck et al., 2005; Schmidt et al., 2014). Such results have been interpreted as evidence 
that threat stimuli capture attention irrespective of top-down goals. As pointed out in the 
introduction, visual search tasks have provided some indirect evidence that the goal-
relevance of a threat stimulus may influence spatial attention. The majority of visual search 
tasks that employed goal-relevant threat targets, showed prioritized attention to this threat. 
However, as pointed out in the introduction the manipulation of goal-relevance in visual 
search is confounded with whether the threat requires a response or not (i.e. the goal-
relevant threat requires a response, whereas the goal-irrelevant threat does not). 
Moreover, none of the visual search studies has compared interference by the same threat 
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distractor when it is goal-relevant and –irrelevant. The dot-probe task employed in chapter 
2 directly compares delayed disengagement from the same threat when it is goal-relevant 
or –irrelevant and has also eliminated potential response confounds by ensuring the threat 
distractor never required a response.  
More importantly, orienting to goal-irrelevant threats as observed in visual search, 
dot-probe, and additional singleton tasks can again be explained by postulating that such 
a goal-irrelevant and non-threatening distractor only provided weak competition for 
attentional resources (as compared to a target or foil with a target identity). Thus, the 
threat distractor could capture attention on these trials. These results have the potential to 
reconcile previous, seemingly contradictory, results by showing that whether a goal-
irrelevant threat distractor captures attention depends on competing stimuli (prioritized 
attention to goal-irrelevant threats: Lipp & Waters, 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Öhman & 
Mineka, 2001; Rinck et al., 2005; Schmidt et al., 2014). Moreover, chapter 4 demonstrated 
that the results showed that even in highly fearful individuals orienting to a goal-irrelevant 
threat was reduced rapidly with increased time-on-task.  
 In summary, these results clearly indicate that the orienting of attention to a 
potential threat is not unaffected by top-down goals. However, it is important to note that 
even the photorealistic threats employed in chapter 3, probably constituted a moderate 
threat and thus it remains to be explored whether top-down processes can modulate 
orienting to more extreme or immediate threats.  
 
The modified spatial cueing paradigm. 
The spatial cueing paradigm I have used in the studies described in this thesis has 
allowed me to assess top-down influences separately on the pre-attentive orienting of 
attention and the subsequent disengagement. The modified cueing paradigm has allowed 
me to neatly manipulate the goal-relevance of the threat distractors. Comparing 
interference by the same threat distractor when it is goal-relevant or goal-irrelevant is a 
significant advance from previous paradigms (e.g. visual search). Moreover, the modified 
cueing paradigm disentangles the orienting of attention and the subsequent 
disengagement by strictly controlling the allocation of attention before the threat stimulus is 
presented. Consequently, the threat is initially attended (disengagement trials) or initially 
unattended (orienting trials; for a similar argument regarding orienting and disengagement 
see Rudaizky et al., 2014). 
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From an encapsulated threat module to a biased-competition model 
As pointed out above, top-down modulation of orienting to and disengagement from 
potential threats cannot be explained by theories of threat processing that propose an 
automatic threat module. Both Öhman & Mineka’s (2001) fear module and LeDoux’s 
(1996) low road propose that the early processing of potential threats in humans proceeds 
in a stimulus-driven manner and are unaffected by the availability of cognitive resources, 
awareness, and current goals. Top-down modulation of orienting as observed in chapter 3 
of this thesis, is at odds with such an automaticity hypothesis.  
Top-down contingent orienting of attention is in line with influential theories of visual 
spatial attention. For example, Wolfe’s guided search (1994) and Treisman and Gelade’s  
feature integration (1980) theories both predict that a target-similar distractor is more likely 
to capture attention than a target-dissimilar distractor (also see contingent capture, Folk, 
Remington, & Johnston, 1992). However, such theories currently do not model stimulus 
threat value (or emotional content) to impact attention. These theories could be extended 
in a relatively straightforward manner to account for delayed de-allocation from a threat 
distractor, even though for example Guided Search (Wolfe, 1994) proposes a fixed 
attentional dwell time and no mechanism that would necessitate elongated dwell times. 
According to these theories, once a stimulus is attended multiple stimulus features are 
bound together and stimulus identity and threat value should be able to be processed. 
Once a stimulus’ threat value is available such information could be modelled to up-
regulate stimulus-driven activation and thus enhance the threat stimulus’ activation on e.g. 
a saliency map. This in turn could delay the disengagement of attention from such a 
threat.  
Theories of attention cannot explain the rapid orienting of attention based on a 
stimulus’ threat value. Specifically, theories of attention (e.g. Feature Integration Theory; 
Treisman & Gelade, 1980) propose that during the pre-attentive, parallel stage of 
processing only isolated stimulus dimensions (e.g. shape and color) and features on these 
dimensions (e.g. sharp angles, red) can be processed. However, features cannot be 
integrated pre-attentively, even if they belong to the same object. Individual features are 
proposed to be bound together only when focal attention is directed to the stimulus in 
question. Thus, according to attention theories the orienting of attention cannot be driven 
by stimulus identity (e.g. spider or cat) or the threat value associated with this identity (e.g. 
threatening or non-threatening). Though a more realistic stimulus that consists of more 
elementary shape features, could activate multiple feature maps in parallel and thus drive 
enhanced activation of a conjunction on the saliency map (Guided Search, Wolfe, 1994). 
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 In sum, theories of threat processing that rely on a threat module are unable to 
account for top-down modulation of orienting whereas attention theories are unable to 
account for pre-attentive orienting to potential threats based on their threat value. One 
theory that seems capable of explaining both results is the theory of Mathews and 
Mackintosh (1998). Mathews and Mackintosh’s (1998) theory combines elements of 
theories drawing on a specialized threat module and those modelling top-down influences 
on attention. In line with the notion of a threat module this theory proposes that we have a 
specialized module – the threat evaluation system (TES) –, which has the sole purpose of 
evaluating the threat value of stimuli in our surrounds (see also Mogg et al.’s, 2000 
valence evaluation system). In the TES, the threat value of all stimuli in the environment is 
automatically and pre-attentively assessed. When the TES tags a stimulus as highly 
threatening it interrupts ongoing goal-driven attention and redirects attention to the threat 
stimulus. Moreover, the TES is proposed to be more sensitive in individuals with higher 
anxiety and thus could potentially explain enhanced orienting to threat in more fearful 
individuals as observed in chapter 4.  
Such a notion of a TES that automatically computes a stimulus its threat value at a 
very early stage of processing, contrasts standard attention theories which as described 
above propose that only a stimulus its individual features can be processed pre-attentively. 
However, the theory proposed by Mathews and Mackintosh does not elaborate much on 
how stimulus threat value can be computed pre-attentively. Additionally, Mathews and 
Mackintosh’s theory proposes that attention to potential threats is not solely susceptible to 
TES activity but can be up- or down-regulated, to a degree, by top-down processes in 
much the same way as non-emotional stimuli are. This could explain the top-down 
modulation of attention to potential threats as observed in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. 
However, again it remains unclear how such top-down modulation is implemented. 
Whereas this theory holds intuitive appeal it fails to explain how a stimulus’ threat value 
can be evaluated pre-attentively and it seems to stand in contrast with theories of attention 
which propose that only simple stimulus features can be processed pre-attentively. 
 To summarize, research on threat processing (especially rodent research; Gross & 
Sabino Canteras, 2012; LeDoux, 1996; Öhman & Mineka’s, 2001; Van Le et al., 2016) 
indicates it is likely that a stimulus’ threat value is computed somewhere in the processing 
chain and critically depends on limbic structures including the amygdala. However, 
attention theories have proposed that such information is not available pre-attentively and 
thus cannot drive the rapid orienting to potential threats (e.g. Treisman & Gelade, 1980). 
I propose that pre-attentive orienting to potential threats does not require the 
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processing of a stimulus’ identity or threat value as has been proposed by e.g. Mathews 
and Mackintosh (1998), Öhman & Mineka’s (2001), and Ledoux (1996). Instead, such 
orienting can be parsimoniously explained by a pre-attentive feature matching mechanism 
that compares features of threat stimuli stored in memory to features currently present in 
the environment. Throughout both evolutionary history and an individual’s learning history, 
certain features have likely become associated with specific threats. 
In line with this hypothesis, working memory content has been demonstrated to 
drive the orienting of attention (Downing, 2000; Gayet, Paffen, & Van der Stichel, 2013; 
Hollingworth & Hwang, 2013; Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006). For example, Olivers 
and colleagues (2006) demonstrated that orienting to a singleton distractor was selectively 
enhanced when it contained a feature that was held in working memory. Not just working 
memory contents but also contents of long term memory have been demonstrated to bias 
attention (Hutchinson & Turke-Browne, 2012; Peelen & Kastner, 2014; Rosen et al., 2015; 
Salvato, Patai, & Nobre, 2016; Stokes et al., 2013). For example, Stokes and colleagues 
(2013) demonstrated that attention can be oriented to a spatial location based on the 
storage of such a location in long term memory. Such memory-based orienting of attention 
is not dependent on explicit recall of such memories (Salvato, Patai, & Nobre, 2016). 
Whereas, previous studies have assessed the influence of long term memory on spatial 
attention, it seems likely that long term memory contents can also guide feature-based 
attention (in a mechanism similar to working memory biasing feature-based attention). 
Thus when a specific feature stored in long term memory (e.g. < 30° angles) is primed, 
orienting of attention would be expected to be biased towards this specific feature.  
Consequently, orienting of attention to the threat distractor as observed in chapter 3 
of this thesis may well be driven, not by the spider’s identity or threat value, but by the 
activation of specific features stored in long term memory (e.g. sharp angles or high 
feature contrast inherent in spiders’ narrow long legs) which in turn up-regulate sensitivity 
of early visual regions for such features. Such features would then be more likely to drive 
the orienting of attention, but would still be subject to top-down modulation, in line with 
task goals. Such a proposal can also explain why orienting to threat stimuli is more readily 
observed in fearful participants since they may have more, and more detailed, threat-
related memories to which features of stimuli that are present in the current environment 
can be matched. For example, an arachnophobic individual may have had many more 
encounters with spiders that would be classified as fear-relevant than a non-fearful 
individual, and such memories may have been encoded or stored in greater detail for the 
fearful individual. Moreover, such memory traces would likely have been strengthened in 
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fearful individuals through frequent subsequent retrieval of such memories (e.g. whenever 
another spider is encountered). Moreover, arachnophobic individuals may have associated 
features with spiders that non-fearful individuals would not or to a lesser degree (e.g. 
anything small that crawls, any round black thing, specific locations like forests, trees, 
attics, basements). 
 Thus, whereas we may indeed have a module akin to a TES (e.g. a circuitry 
centred on the amygdala), I would propose that the pre-attentive orienting of attention to 
threat is likely contingent on matching current features to features stored in threat 
memories (amygdala-hippocampal circuitry). Such an explanation is in line with 
feedforward and feedback connections between early visual regions in the occipital lobe 
and the amygdala (Catani et al., 2003; Furl et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2011; Morris et al., 
1998). Which specific region in early visual cortex is modulated would depend on the 
specific feature at hand. For example Furl and colleagues (2013) have demonstrated 
differential amygdala connection depending on whether the threat at hand contained static 
or motion features, with the latter feeding back into area MT (amongst other areas; Furl et 
al., 2013). This renders it likely that processing of visual stimuli likely proceeds in multiple 
feedforward and feedback waves as proposed, for instance, by Pessoa and Adolphs 
(2010).  
In sum, I propose that orienting to potential threats does not necessitate the pre-
attentive processing of a stimulus’ threat value. Instead, I propose that the rapid orienting 
to potential threats could be driven by memory-driven increased sensitivity (mediated by 
an amygdala-hippocampal circuitry) to specific stimulus features that are present in the 
current environment. Furthermore, since rapid orienting to threat usually relies on the 
repeated presentation of similar threats over multiple trials, the visual system may become 
sensitized to such features in the first few experimental trials. 
 
Future research directions 
There are several questions related to the role top-down processes in the orienting 
to and disengaging from potential threats that require further investigation. Some 
outstanding questions have already been mentioned in the discussion sections of the 
individual chapters. The current section provides additional suggestions for the future 
research that draw on the three studies discussed in the current thesis and the proposed 
feature-driven mechanism behind orienting to threat. 
First, further research is needed to explore how the results observed in the current 
thesis extend to other threats (e.g. angry faces), negatively valenced but non-threatening 
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stimuli (e.g. disgusted faces or disgusting IAPS pictures), and positively valenced stimuli 
(e.g. babies, individuals from the opposite sex, or stimuli paired with monetary rewards; for 
an example of the former see e.g. Brosch, Sander, Pourtois, & Scherer, 2008). If similar 
results can be observed for such other stimuli then this may point to the fact that threat 
stimuli are not as special as sometimes hypothesized and that perhaps the critical 
dimension is not threat value but a stimulus its relevance to an organism overarching 
behavioural goals (e.g. avoiding harm, finding a mate, gaining money). Such goals would 
differ from the immediate top-down task goals as described in attentional theories, 
because they would be higher level goals that are active throughout a large number of 
different tasks. 
Second, future research employing the modified cueing paradigm could benefit from 
embedding neutral baseline trials within each experiment. On these trials no threat (or 
neutral comparison) distractor should be presented. This would allow one to measure 
target-driven effects on the RTs and to assess whether a direct RT comparison can be 
made between different cueing experiments (e.g. an experiment were the threat distractor 
is goal-relevant or –irrelevant). Alternatively, such baseline RTs could be used to 
normalize the data.  
Third, future studies could explore the role of stimulus competition in the modified 
cueing paradigm by including target present trials as well as target absent trials. In the 
target absent trials competition for attentional resources should be lower than in the target 
present trials and thus delays in disengagement may be more pronounced. Additionally, 
one could manipulate the target salience, such that the target salience differs from trial to 
trial. This could be achieved e.g. by manipulating the target-color to be more or less 
dissimilar from the distractors (e.g., several different target colors on a scale ranging from 
grey to bright green). This would allow assessing how target salience affects orienting to 
and disengagement from the threat distractor. Again, one could hypothesize that orienting 
to and disengagement from the threat distractor may be more pronounced when the target 
is less salient and thus provides less powerful competition for attentional resources. 
Alternatively, one could hypothesize that the successful detection of a less salient target 
would require a tighter top-down attentional set and thus should reduce rapid orienting to 
and delayed disengagement from a threat distractor.  
Future research could directly assess whether top-down modulation of 
disengagement from a goal-irrelevant distractor is contingent on whether such control is 
encouraged by the task-demands. This could be done by employing the modified cueing 
paradigm as employed in the current studies and manipulating the presentation duration of 
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the search display over different task blocks (e.g. 50, 100, and 150ms). In task blocks with 
the shortest presentation duration (i.e. similar to the duration used in the current studies) 
no disengagement delay would be expected if it is the short presentation duration that 
encourages top-down control. According to this hypothesis, one may observe 
disengagement delays from and pre-attentive orienting to a task-goal irrelevant threat with 
increased stimulus presentation duration as distractor and target may be attended 
sequentially.  
Fourth, future research would be needed to assess how more realistic threats (e.g. 
a live spider) affect attention in real-life settings. One could accomplish this by presenting 
a live spider in a room whilst using eye-tracking. Whereas this would add to external 
generalizability it would decrease the experimental control and in the example provided 
only a single trial would be available for data analysis. All studies I conducted for this 
thesis employed pictorial threats that were presented briefly as this allows for tight 
experimental control. However, there may be a trade-off between experimental control and 
external generalizability. Thus it may be worth designing future studies that employ real-
world threat stimuli (see e.g. Kwakkenbos, Becker, & Rinck, 2010 for a study employing a 
real spider) and measure overt attention with a head-mounted eye-tracking device.  
Fifth, it would be important to test the proposed hypothesis that orienting to potential 
threats is driven by specific features rather than threat value. One way to test such a 
proposal is to condition a neutral stimulus to become fear-relevant. This could be 
accomplished through a differential conditioning procedure where during acquisition one 
stimulus (e.g. a yellow square) is always followed by a mild electric shock and another 
stimulus (e.g. a blue triangle) is not. In this way the yellow square should be stored away 
as a potential threat and its associated features may be yellow and 90 degree angles. In a 
next phase of the experiment one could present the threat stimulus, the neutral stimulus, 
and a range of new stimuli that contain one of the threat or neutral features (e.g. yellow 
circle, blue oval). If orienting to potential threats is driven by simple stimulus features, 
attention should be rapidly oriented, not only to the threat stimulus, but also to the stimuli 
that contain one of the features inherent in the threat stimulus (e.g. yellow or square). In 
subsequent studies one could employ an event-related fMRI study to evaluate whether 
subcortical structures that have been implicated in threat processing (e.g. the amygdala 
and BNST), show increased activity not only when a threat is presented but also when a 
non-threat is presented that contains such a threat feature. 
Sixth, whilst the sample size in the current experiments is comparable to that in 
other published work assessing attention to threat using reaction time measures (e.g. 
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Carlson & Reinke, 2014; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Koster, Crombez, Van Damme, 
Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004), future research in this domain may want to assess 
whether the use of larger sample sizes could be beneficial. Specifically, such research 
could assess whether the use of larger sample sizes could contribute to a higher 
consistency of results.  
 
Concluding remarks 
This thesis demonstrates that goal-driven processes can modulate the pre-attentive 
orienting of attention and the disengagement of focal attention that play a role in the 
processing of threats. These results are in contrast with claims of encapsulated and 
automatic threat processing. Whilst this thesis shows that threat stimuli can be prioritized 
for processing, it demonstrates that prioritized attention to threat is contingent on bottom-
up as well as top-down processes. Moreover, the current results suggest that the bottom-
up versus top-down distinction may not be sufficient to describe attentional allocation to 
stimuli that are relevant to an organism its overarching goals (e.g. stimuli associated with 
threat) but not to the immediate task-goal. Overall, the current thesis suggest that the 
processing of potential threats is contingent on top-down processes akin to the way that 
non-emotional stimuli are.  
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Footnote 1 
 
I also conducted a direct comparison of the results of the experiments reported in 
Chapters 2 and 3. For the experiments where the threat was task-relevant, a significant 
three-way interaction of stimulus type (silhouette vs. photorealistic), distractor type (threat 
vs. non-threat), and trial type (validly-cued, invalidly-cued, foil-cued) was observed. 
Specifically, follow-up t-tests indicated that only disengagement from the threat was 
modulated by how realistic the threat distractor was (i.e. disengagement was slowed more 
for the more realistic threats). 
For the experiments where the threat was task-relevant, results were difficult to 
interpret and only a significant main effect of stimulus type (silhouette vs. photorealistic) 
was observed, such that overall reaction times were uniformly faster when silhouette 
stimuli were presented as compared to photorealistic stimuli.  
  
  131 
Appendix A – Visual Stimuli 
Chapter 2 
 Distractors. 
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Chapters 3 & 4 
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